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ABSTRACT
The modem liberal university is based upon a philosophical framework first
conceptualized by John Dewey in his seminal book Democracy and Education.
Although Dewey’s philosophy was instrumental in reforming the university, it
possesses an inherent contradiction that has proved problematic for the manner in
which the modem North American university functions. While Dewey’s theories
were aimed at democratizing the university and allowing for the pursuit of critical
freedom, his main goal was to bring the university in line with the economic realities
of industrial capitalism. Herein lies the contradiction: the student is free to study
whatever she may wish, but this freedom must ultimately accede to economic
integration.
The aim o f this thesis is to articulate and examine the above contradiction and
to investigate how the liberal university functions as a capitalist institution—an
institution that is, above all, aimed at supporting the dominant economic framework.
Thus I will critically examine the philosophy of education and the liberal university
using Marxian philosophy. I will investigate how this institution captures, codes, and
disciplines its students. Finally I will attempt to conceptualize an alternative
philosophy of education using the ground-breaking theories in Paulo Freire’s
Pedagogy of the Oppressed.
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Prologue
“Education is suffering from narration sickness.”
-Paulo Freire, “Pedagogy o f the Oppressed”-

The university is an institutional shadow cast by the capitalist North American
state. Since a shadow reflects the shape and form of the object that casts it, the university
reflects the shape of modem capitalism found in North American society. As the state’s
shadow it is also part of what Deleuze and Guattari call the social machine (“socius”) and
so serves the purpose o f conditioning and coding its student to become part of the state
system.
This thesis will empirically substantiate the preceding claim. The comparison of
society to a machine is based upon Deleuze and Guattari’s contention that any social
arrangement, any state, requires an assemblage of parts (institutions, people,
architectures) in order to function properly. Thus, just as a machine’s sole function is
efficiency, and such effiency is only possible if all the assembled parts work together
properly, so a society is judged socially efficient due to the interrelation of its own parts.
This machinic description of society will be expanded and explained in more detail
throughout the text.
Furthermore, I have chosen to analyze and describe the capitalist reality of North
American society by way of Karl Marx and Marxist influenced theorists. The reason I
have chosen this theoretical framework is “because of capitalism—unfinished business of
a serious magnitude... The major source of practical, brutally effective reductionism and
totalization at work on the planet today is not Marxism, but the world market, now
enabled by computer networks, satellite broadcasts, just-in-time production, and hightech weaponry.”1 Few would dispute that we live in a capitalist society, and I have
chosen to use a Marxist critique of capitalism because Marxist theory is the only

1 Dyer-Witheford, p. 9.
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philosophical body o f literature that has provided a consistent, logical, critical, and
thorough analysis of capitalism. Although this description and analysis of capitalism will
be revealed in the following pages, in relation to the university, I will define capitalism
here as a social system
based on the imposition of universal commodification,
including, centrally, the buying and selling of human life
time. Its tendency is to subordinate all activity to the law of
value—the socially imposed law of exchange. It relates a
monological master-narrative in which only money talks.
Such a system operates by process of massive reduction—
Marx called it “abstraction”—that perceives and processes
the world solely as an array of economic factors. Under
this classificatory grid—this “classing” of the w o r ld human subjects figure only as so much labour power and
consumption capacity,
and their natural surroundings as so
'y
much raw material.
Since the university is an institution which is central to the reproduction of the capitalist
system, it too must be subject to critique when the legitimacy of that system is in
question. Moreover, because the pedagogical approach that I am proposing at the end of
this paper is developed from the successful educational philosophy of Paulo Freire, a
Marxist thinker, then it would seem only logical to use a Marxist approach to provide a
background to Freire’s pedagogy.
Due to the fact that I will be describing a situation where the student is, according
to Daniel Cohn-Bendit, allowed “a measure of liberty, but only so long as [she does not]
challenge the basis o f university education: the preparation [to] return to the ranks of
[capitalist society] from which [she has] taken temporary leave of absence,”3 I would be
naive to assume that I am exempt from this pedagogical problem. Moreover, many of the
theoretical sources that will be used in this project are also products of the institution that

2 Ibid., p. 9.

3 Cohn-Bendit, p. 27
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is being critiqued. A paper with such an identity is bound to be plagued by the very
symptoms I hope to describe. Such a paper is bound to the rules of academia. The
contradiction this paper seems to fall victim to is in fact a product of the contradictory
nature of the current university system. The liberal model of education from which the
modem university has evolved contained a contradiction when it was first framed. In this
introduction I will briefly summarize this contradiction, beginning with an exposition of
Dewey’s educational philosophy. This summary will provide necessary background for
the thesis I will advance. That thesis is that the universities possess the potential to
radically change society, but the liberal model of education is a barrier to this potential.

Dewey’s model of liberal education
American philosopher John Dewey’s model of education has been influential “in a
number of ways in the democratic administration of schools and universities.”4 Although
there are a number of sources which may be examined in order to understand the liberal
educational system, Dewey’s philosophical approach, in Democracy & Education will be
summarized in order to provide a basic introduction to the manner in which the current
institution functions. Indeed, Dewey’s educational theories are probably the best
introduction to the liberal system because they have had enormous influence on the way
the modem university functions.
Dewey begins Democracy & Education with the stated desire to connect education
with the experimental method of the sciences and with modem society as a whole:
As societies become more complex in structure and
resources, the need of formal or intentional teaching and
learning increases. As formal teaching and training grow in
extent, there is a danger of creating an undesirable split

4 Dewey, Jane M., p. 39.
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between the experience gained in more direct associations
and what is acquired at school.5
The liberal model’s justification, then, was to reform education so that it would fall in
line with modem society. Dewey believed that academia was not providing students with
the proper ways o f associating with the technological world because “the rapid growth in
the last few centuries of knowledge and technical modes of skill”6 had outstripped the
organization o f education.
It should be noted at this point that the liberal concept of education, as evidenced
in Dewey, originally possessed a positive agenda. Dewey felt that the student was being
“trained like an animal rather than educated like a human being.”7 Education, then, was
conceived o f as “a fostering, a nurturing, a cultivating, process.”8 The idea was to
produce a strong individual through this process of cultivation. Thus, Dewey recognizes
the problem of how the educational process became concerned with the formation of “the
citizen” and not the “man”.9 Taking his cue from Kant, Dewey “defines education as the
process by which man becomes man.”10 Contrasted with “the citizen”, “the man” is the
socially stable and free individual, and humanity, for Dewey, is the composition of these
free individuals. Therefore, the liberal ideal so far as it is concerned with “the promotion
of the best possible realization of humanity as humanity,”11 is progressive.

5 Dewey, p. 9.
6 ibid.
7 ibid., p. 13.
8 ibid., p. 10
9 ibid., p. 93.
10 ibid., p. 95.
11 ibid.

4
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However Dewey is not only concerned with the cultivation of humanity. He is
equally concerned with modem society, the general aim of liberal education is “social
efficiency... [and] the importance of industrial competency”12 since individuals need to
survive and function within the overarching societal structure. The prime function of
education, therefore, is to produce in the student the “result ability to make one’s way
economically in the world and to manage economic resources usefully”.13 Education,
then, has an “instrumental value” as a means to an end14 —the end being the integration of
the student with society. This end is necessary because education must mirror the
“accompanying... advance of science, the industrial revolution, and the development of
democracy.”15 This movement towards societal integration is in contradiction with
Dewey’s goal o f cultivating human capacities, and we will examine both poles of the
contradiction.
First I would like to stress that Dewey’s conception of educational reforms is bom
from an ideal to cultivate humanity. The philosophy discussed in Democracy &
Education is one which (hue to its claims) conceives of the educational process as
democratic. Dewey believes that all of the disciplines have their proper place because
“[a]ll of them together make up the whole of life by just opposition and addition.”16 The
liberal model of education, however, is intrinsically flawed due to its prime aim at social
efficiency, which I will demonstrate below.
Thus, his commitment to diversity not withstanding, Dewey asserts that the values
of all disciplines are valid, his model is one of integration: one must be fostered to take
12 ibid., p. 119.
13 ib id .

14 ibid., p. 243.
15 ibid., p. 331.
16 ibid., p. 247.

5
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one’s place in modem, capitalist society. Here his model is contradictory. The
“humanity” of the student, then, is the result of this integration; even though Dewey
claims he is interested in the “individual” and not the “citizen” he is interested in a
particular kind of individual: the capitalist individual whose education is an instrumental
means to this end. Thus, as noted above, “the liberal university allows its students a
measure of liberty, but only so long as they do not challenge the basis of university
education: the preparation... for a return to the ranks of [capitalist society] from which
they have taken a temporary leave of absence.”17
Furthermore, the philosophy of education is concerned with giving “individuals a
personal interest in social relationships and control, and the habits of mind which secure
social changes without introducing disorder.”18 In this sense, Dewey’s model of
education is progressive on analogy with the way in which capitalism is progressive vis-avis feudalism—individuals are still socially integrated, but technological and social
advances change the method of integration19—and the progression ends there. Control is
placed alongside social relationships, and one is taught to bring about social change
without disrupting the overall system—to be taught to work within the system.
Finally, Dewey’s model of education is one that mirrors the capitalist socius
(although Dewey always refers to this society as “democratic society”). As
aforementioned, the educational institution is supposed to represent the societal structure,
accompanying its advances, and emphasizing the goal of economic integration and
competency. Thus, his conception of education becomes—however unintentioned— a
“banking concept” (where students are the banks in which their teachers make deposits).

17 Cohn-Bendit, p. 27.
18 Dewey, p. 99, emphasis added.
19 This will be examined in later chapters in relation to Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of the
“Apparatus of Capture” and the movement from “social subjection” to “machinic enslavement”.

6
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It regards humans “as adaptable, manageable beings”20 who are raised up (“nurtured”,
“cultivated”, “fostered”) by an educational authority. This patronizing attitude of
education is evident at the beginning of Democracy & Education where Dewey writes,
“[w]e also speak of rearing, raising, bringing up—words which express the difference of
level which education aims to cover.”21
Here I have contented myself with a general overview which should serve to
orient the reader with the position this paper will adopt. I will develop specific criticisms
at appropriate points in later sections.

The contradictory nature of the university. An ideal pedagogy
If Dewey’s pedagogy is central to the modem university, the basis of this
institution is contradictory. Dewey’s philosophy makes evident that there is a strong
inclination to produce free thinking individuals (educating students as human beings
instead of animals) but this inclination is overridden by the very fact that such an
education is driven by the goal of socialization and integration. Moreover, this social
production is justified by the belief that the educational process is grounded on this
principle of freedom. The overall contradiction can be summed up in Daniel CohnBendit’s aforementioned claim that the university institution offers the student (or the
professor) “a measure of liberty” within its shadow, but only as a leave of absence from
modem, capitalist society. It is not that this measure of liberty is bad in itself, since
without this critical freedom a number of the resources used in this paper would not exist
(Deleuze, for example, and Foucault taught and wrote within the academic world).
The point, then, is to expand this measure of liberty found in the university so that
the student can engage freely in her own education—a freedom which extends beyond
20 Freire, p. 54.
21 Dewey, p. 10.

7
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academia and into the social world. Just as Marx grounded Hegel’s abstract freedom in
the social realm, the critical freedom inside academia must be expanded so that it leaves
with the students and reaches out beyond the institutional shadow.
It is the aim o f this paper, then, to criticize the prevailing institutions from the
perspective of an ideal pedagogy where the efforts of the educators coincide with the
educated “to engage in critical thinking and the quest for mutual humanization.”22 The
task, therefore, is to conceive of the student on analogy with Marx’s alienated worker.
The university only exists because there are students who believe that the system will
grant them a “measure o f freedom”.
However, the apparent freedom and ‘“humanism’ of the banking approach
[evident in the liberal educational model] masks the effort to turn women and men into
automatons—the very negation of their ontological vocation to be fully human.”23 Thus,
this paper will first examine the structure of this society’s liberal university in more detail
as a socializing force and a system that uses the “banking approach”. It will conclude
with a sketch of a liberating university.

This paper’s project will begin by discussing

the university in relation to capitalism, which will provide the general theoretical
framework for understanding the university’s identity as a socializing institution. The
second section will examine the methods of regimentation the university utilizes, and the
third section will conclude the investigation of the university as a socializing force by
reexamining the liberal educational model of knowledge in more detail. The final
section will examine the ideal model of pedagogy, proposed in the philosophy of Paulo
Freire.

22 Freire, p. 56.
23 ibid, p. 55.

8
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CHAPTER ONE:
the liberal university and its general relation to capitalism
“Once upon a time the universities had a certain
prestige; the student persists in the belief that he is
lucky to be there. But he came too late. His
mechanical, specialized education is as profoundly
degraded... as his own intellectual level, because the
modem economic system demands a mass production
o f [critically] uneducated students who have been
rendered incapable o f thinking.”
Situationist International, “On the Poverty o f
Student Life ”

Introduction
“In a word,” write Deleuze and Guattari, “the socius as a full body forms a surface
where all production is recorded, whereupon the entire process appears to emanate from
this recording surface. Society constructs its own delirium by recording the process of
production”.1 In other words, the capitalist socius exists as a totality that distributes
institutions and people with a consciousness of a false reality—a consciousness that
capitalism is reality and everything appears to emanate from this concept. The university
system, according to Deleuze and Guattari’s idea, exists as a direct result of capitalism’s
delirium: it is proposed, by liberal idealists, that their concept of a reformed and ‘free’
university can only exist within the current socius; otherwise, as Dewey wrote, referring
to the pre-liberal university system, the student will be “trained like an animal”.
Capitalism constructs a delirium (a true consciousness of false reality)—it constructs
reality in its own image—and therefore the university and its students should only be
understood in the context of the social whole as captured products within a larger system
of delirium.

1 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 10.
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Reality, however, has been coded by the axioms of “the social machine which
takes the place of the old codings and organizes all of the... flows of scientific and
technical code, for the benefit of the capitalist system and in service of its ends.”2 Thus,
capitalism as a social machine has reorganized the structure of the pre-capitalist
university in order to make this institution beneficial to capitalism. As will be evidenced
and discussed below, the university is instrumental in promoting these flows of capitalist
coding3 —allowing the student to be coded, controlled and socialized. This chapter of the
thesis will examine the university as a disseminator of capitalist code, and thus how this
institution is primarily capitalist—how it emanates from the surface of the socius—in
theory and practice. The aim of this chapter, therefore, is to focus on the general shape
the capitalist shadow o f the university takes.
The following section will examine the nature of the student as a commodity, by
comparing her to Marx’s alienated worker. Next, the general form of the liberal
university-in which the commodified student exists—will be described in terms of
Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the “apparatus of capture” . The following sections, on
Lukacs’ concept of “reification” and Debord’s theory of the “spectacle”, will investigate
the nature of the capitalistic relation between the commodified student and the university.
The focus of this chapter is to examine the liberal university as a capitalist machine for
the production of worker-citizens. The theoretical positions taken in the chapter will be
justified empirically in the concluding section.
(Before proceeding any further, I should note that since this chapter’s goal is to
describe the university’s relation to capitalism its analysis is mostly from the point of
2 ibid., p. 233.
3 I realize, of course, that Deleuze and Guattari claim that capitalism possesses axiomatic flows
which decode the socius but present the illusion of coding. This is a distinction, however, which
was used to compare the cultural “codes” of social subjection (evident in pre-capitalist societies),
and the economic “axioms” of machinic enslavement (evident in capitalism )-a distinction which, if
pursued, would take this paper off its path.

10
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view of capitalism or, more accurately, it is a top-down approach that mainly examines
the system’s super-structure. The truth, however, is that we shape the system as much as
it shapes us. This fact, though, will be explored in detail in the final chapter.)

The student as alienated
Although the alienated worker of Marx’s time lived in a much worse situation
than the university student in North America (who is, mostly but not exclusively, a
member of the privileged class), there is a definite relation between the two. This section
will examine how the student, to some degree, “sinks to the level of a commodity”4 by
investigating how the student class is alienated from the professor class, how the student
becomes alienated from her work, how the student becomes alienated from her nature,
and how the student becomes alienated from other students.
Analogously to Marx’s theory of classes, the educational structure of the liberal
university appears to be divided into two groups: professors and students~“the property
owners and the propertyless workers”5, the property being intellectual and educational
property. The truth, however, is that the university administration is the dominant class,
and that the professors are merely a representation of the university administration;
professors are also subject to alienation because they are also workers. Rather than
having complete autonomy, university professors are like the managers of the factory
system-workers as well, but in positions of authority. While the administration is the
primary agent o f transmission for the capitalist code, university teachers are exploited as
mouthpieces o f this transmission and the students are alienated from their teachers due to
4 Marx, p. 106.
5 ibid.
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an authoritarian structure.6 The professor class, representing the administration, controls
areas like the “flows o f scientific and technical code”, and the student must work for the
privilege of being coded. Therefore, sometimes “the teacher confuses the authority of
knowledge with his or her own professional authority, which she and he sets in
opposition to the freedom of the students.”7
Within this divided structure the student produces work which she “confronts...
as something alien, as a power independent o f [herself].”8 Papers, assignments, exams all
become products to which the student is in bondage. The student’s job is to meet
deadlines and produce work that has the nature of “an alien object.”9 Thus, the student
puts her life into [her school work]; but now [her] life no longer belongs to [her] but to
the [school work].”10 In this manner, the product of the student’s labour stands over her
as the force by which she is known and judged by the university institution. Moreover,
when the student investigates her marks, applies for continuing education, grants, or a
job, the product of her labour “becomes a power on its own confronting [her].”11
The fact that the student has become a slave to her school work “enables [her] to
exist, first, as a [student]-, and, second as a physical subject. ”12 Reduced, in the eyes of
the university institution to the identity of student—and, as such, to an “SEU” (student
enrollment unit)—the individual within this system becomes alienated from both herself
and her own products. The work space maxim you are your job is replicated in the
6 This point will be discussed further in Chapters Three and Four.
7 Freire, p. 54.
8 Marx, p. 108.
9 ibid.
10 ibid.
11 ibid.
12 ibid., p. 109.
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university: you are your grades. Therefore, a student’s worth is derived from her nature
as a function of the institutional ranking grid, and not as a student understood as a freely
engaged intellectual being.
In the capitalist socius at large, “the direct relationship between the worker (labor)
and production”13 is concealed. The worker generates capital through the commodities
she produces for a business and its owners. Yet the owners of this business exert the
power to control the worker in the form of wages, hiring, and firing. Similarly, the
student generates capital, both in the form of tuition and intellectual capital through her
work, for the educational institution and its professors. However this institution exerts
the force to control the student in the form of marking and teaching. Furthermore, the
teacher always educates, and it is the student’s job to be educated. As Freire argues:
The teacher presents himself to his students as their
necessary opposite; by considering their ignorance absolute,
he justifies his own existence. The students, alienated like
the slave in the Hegelian dialectic, accept their ignorance as
justifying the teacher’s existence—but... they never discover
that they educate the teacher.14
Although there is latitude for a reciprocal relationship between professor and student, the
liberal educational model restricts its scope. The student’s intellectual labour, then, is
further estranged from her being; she regards it as the product of the teacher’s
authoritative pedagogy—a regurgitation of lectures and approved texts—rather than her
own product that has been produced through a process of mutual pedagogy. The grading
format provides a powerful sign, in the form of a mark, which strengthens the
authoritarian structure: the student, who is her paper, is marked and graded by her
teacher. Her final worth is assessed and then reduced to a letter or a percentage. The

13 ibid., p. 110.
14 Freire, p. 53.
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student is thus a commodity, that is, a product of the entire institution—coded by
information that is controlled by the administrative class.
Therefore, the student’s alienated labour “makes his life activity, his essential
being, a mere means to his existence.”15 Like Marx’s alienated worker, the student is
both alienated in the process of her labour and in its product. Just as the activity of
education is alienated so too is the commodified product. The human being’s intrinsic
ability to learn and critically engage with the world becomes, within the liberal university,
a means to an economic existence in the capitalist socius at large: a “result ability to make
one’s way economically in the world”.16 The process of education, emanating, according
to Deleuze and Guattari, from the capitalist coding, will reduce the student’s freedom and
education to an economic means of existence.
Furthermore, and still in line with the analogy with Marx, the liberal university
alienates students from each other:
[w]hat applies to a man’s relation to his work, to the
product of his labor... also holds of a man’s relation to the
other m an... each man views the other in accordance with
the standard and the relationship in which he finds himself
as a [student].17
As workers are placed against one another in the workplace in order to compete for better
paying jobs and their bosses’ attention, so the students can compete for higher marks (for
not everyone is allowed to receive an “A”), grants, and graduate school. In some areas of
university, like Law School or Medical School, competition is so extreme that texts will
be defaced or stolen in order to prevent others’ from having equal access to information.
Neither does this capitalist form of competition end with the student; it accompanies her
15 Marx, p. 113.
16 Dewey, p. 119.
17 Marx, p. 114-115.
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as she enters the economic world or, if she chooses to stay within the university
institution and become professor, she must compete with others for academic honour.
Ultimately, the professor is part of the above process as well. Although this
section has examined how the professor has been set against the student, the conflict
between teacher and student is, as aforementioned, a tool of a capitalistic administration.
By allowing the professor to foster student alienation, the administration creates what
Freire calls the teacher-student contradiction and perpetuates heirarchical control over
intellectual labour. By setting these two groups in opposition to one another, the
administration attempts to obscure the possiblity of “connections between both students
and instructors... [who may notice that] their conditions [are] far closer to that of the rest
of the labor force.”18
Finally, the students’ education becomes “an alien power... because it belongs to
some other man than the [student]

More specifically, the students’ labour belongs to

the university: the net grade point average—along with the amount of SEUs—provide the
institution with a respectable status, resulting in profit in the form of more SEUs. I will
now develop this point through Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the apparatus of
capture.

The university as apparatus of capture
The institution of the modem university is intrinsically capitalist because
“[k]nowledge, information, and specialized education are just as much parts of capital...
as is the most elementary labor of the worker.”20 This section will investigate the fact
that education has been appropriated by the capitalist machine. As was discussed at the
18 Dyer-Witheford, p. 112.
19 Marx, p. 115.
20 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 234.
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beginning of this chapter, all methods of social production are recorded upon the surface
of a socius so that they appear to emanate from its identity and form part of the social
reality. Just as there have been imperial and feudal recordings, so too now there is a
capitalist recording. “State societies,” write Deleuze and Guattari, “are defined by
apparatuses of capture [that is, institutional structures which situate and locate individuals
within the laws of the social machine]; urban societies by instruments of polarization;
nomadic societies by war machines; and finally [despotic and/or capitalist] organizations
are defined by the encompassment of heterogeneous social formations.”21 The State is
the dominant apparatus of capture, but it possesses within it similar such apparatuses of
capture which perform a similar function at smaller levels. The state, then, is the
megamachine22 and its constituent parts are micromachines of varying degrees—from
institutions like the university, down to individuals like the student. This section will
discuss Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of apparatus o f capture and how the commodity
nature of the worker, discussed by Marx, is illuminated by the notion of machinic
enslavement. It will conclude with investigating this concept in light of the university and
the alienated student.
Before going any further, however, it is important to understand what Deleuze and
Guattari mean by “machine”—a concept for them that has much more depth than the
factory machines that Marx analyzed during early industrialism. Although this term
refers as well to factory machines, war machines, and other technological machines which
propagate capital, “any assemblage of [human] desire—at a subjective or social level—is
[according to Deleuze and Guattari] a ‘machine’. The term is aimed to break with
humanist concepts of natural identities, to emphasize... the constructed, produced, and

21 Deleuze and Guattari, 1000 Plateaus, p. 435.
22 ibid.
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collectively fabricated nature of psyche and society.”23 Thus, while individuals may be
machinically enslaved, they possess the potential to liberate themselves by constructing
new arrangements of what they desire. In this way it is possible for them to liberate what
they truly want from what the market makes it possible to want. By investigating the
concept of desire and its arrangements, Deleuze and Guattari, while accepting the critical
histories of various Marxisms, go beyond the traditional conceptual boundaries of this
philosophy. They maintain that desire is important, and how we arrange this desire has
implications on the social level. The implications of such a concept of desire will be
discussed in greater detail in the final chapter of this thesis.
With the basic concept of “machine” now defined, Deleuze and Guattari’s concept
of an apparatus o f capture means, basically, that a State formation needs-in order to be a
formation-to capture and produce citizens to desire that which it provides. Thus,
individuals are caught in a delirium, the false construction of reality that claims that
capitalism is eternal. As they explain:
This is the social machine’s supreme task, inasmuch as the
apportioning of production corresponds to extractions from
a chain, resulting in a residual share for each member, in a
global system of desire and destiny that organizes the
productions of production, the productions of recording, and
the productions of consumption.24
In order to exist as a State, then, the socius must capture, code, and organize its members
in a specific formation.
In this manner, the “State as apparatus of capture has a power o f appropriation’^
due to the fact that nothing is exempt from becoming part of the overall process of the

23 Dyer-Witheford, p. 181.
24 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 142.
25 Deleuze and Guattari, 1000 Plateaus, p. 437.
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self-expansion of the megamachine. It is for this reason that Deleuze and Guattari could
assert that knowledge and education are parts of capital. Inspired by Marx’s Capital,
Deleuze and Guattari argue that the dominant apparatus of capture in capitalism (of which
smaller apparatuses are constituent parts) is defined by three factors: land (which includes
rent and the landowner), work (which includes profit and the entrepreneur), and money
(which includes taxation and the banker).26 It is these three factors which make “possible
the capitalist mode o f production itself’27, as Marx had noted in Capital, since these three
components are the basis of the world market. For it is these factors which “form the first
seeds of private property... develop trade, and... invent a kind of private slavery.”28 That
is, capitalism is a form of slavery “no longer determined as [traditional] slavery or
serfdom but [which has become] naked and free labor”.29
The concepts of naked, free labour and, eventually, independent capital make
reality appear as if the State has ceased to exist as an independent power arrayed against
individuals. The market rules all and has “deterritorialized” specific political
organizations:
That is why capitalism marks a mutation in worldwide or
ecumenical organizations, which now take on a consistency
of their own: the worldwide axiomatic... determines [social
formations’] relations, while organizing an international
division of labor. From all of these standpoints, it could be
said that capitalism develops an economic order that could
do without the State. And in fact capitalism is not short on
war cries against the State, not only in the name of the
market, but by virtue of its superior deterritorialization.30
26 ibid., p. 443-444.
27 ibid., p. 447.
28 ibid., p. 449.
29 ibid., p. 452.
30 ibid., p. 454.
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The truth of the matter is that “States, in capitalism, are not canceled out but change form
and take on new meaning”31 (ie. deterritorialized), and capitalism becomes the new State
realization. Even independent institutions are recoded by the forces of capitalism.
Therefore, the modem State corresponds to capitalism and “corresponds as a process of
subjection,”32 an apparatus of capture. Governmental programs, then, may be overridden
by market concerns (reductions in educational spending that results in hikes in university
tuition, for example). But this fact “is one very partial aspect of capital.”33
Prior to capitalism, apparatuses of capture had captured their citizens through
processes of social subjection: cultural codes of tradition, practice, communal formation
were imposed upon the citizen (the “divine right of kings”, for example, operated because
the peasants were subjected to the belief that monarchies were ordained by God).
Capitalism, however, captures its members through a process of machinic enslavement—a
process that was only made possible through the technical realities of capitalism.
Machinic enslavement, then, is a different apparatus of capture then social subjection.
Social subjection, after all, has always existed. It was presupposed by the concept of the
imperial and despotic State formations that subjected citizens through culture, slavery or
serfdom. The capitalist State, however, has “through technological development...
substituted an increasingly powerful social subjection for machinic enslavement”34 which
has the power to recode individual desire.
Although machinic enslavement may bear many faces such as television, the
internet, or the film industry, its immediate form is labour. Here the worker literally

31 ibid.
32 ibid., p. 456.
33 ibid.
34 ibid., p. 457.
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becomes the machine; the State has set itself up as a ‘‘human-machine system”35 where
every person’s desire is required to allow capital to flow—consumption and production, as
I will discuss in a later chapter, are the functions of this machine. Whereas early
capitalism created a system where the worker was yoked to the machine, modem
capitalism has birthed a new machinic enslavement which is the “reinvention of a
machine of which human beings are constituent parts, instead of subjected workers or
users.”36
Both machinic enslavement and social subjection are forms of the apparatus of
capture insofar as they ensnare individuals, and tie them to the State. Every single socius
has, as aforementioned, used apparatuses of capture to attempt to program the
consciousness of citizens to ensure that they act in such a way as to reproduce the system.
In the ancient Greekpolis, for example, the social subjection of the slave served to
negatively construct the “free” citizen. (This construction can be observed in Aristotle’s
Politics where, in Book I for example, a distinction is emphasized between the master
who is a “political animal”37, and slaves who are merely animals “help[ing] with their
bodies to supply our essential needs.”38 The latter type of animal—excluded from politics
and hence the polis—is “incapable of participating in the association which we call the
state.”39) In the case of capitalism, in contrast, the apparatus of capture has reversed
itself by defining the citizen as what it has captured. The free citizen of today-the
individual who has societal worth—is one who has been enslaved to the machine.

35 ibid., p. 458.
36 ibid.
37 Aristotle, 1253a.
38 ibid., 1254b.
39 ibid., 1253a.
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It would be wrong, though, to conceive of today’s machine as the machine found
on the factory floor o f early industrialism. The “machine” encompasses factory machines
and workers and is in reality the social organization of work. Furthermore, the social
organization of work extends beyond the factory and into the bureaucracies and the
university classroom. The contemporary form of social organization is such that “human
beings themselves are constituent pieces of a machine that they compose among
themselves and with other things... under the control and direction of a higher unity.”40
The higher unity is the capitalist State, and even the students at a university interact to
compose this machine. In this manner, modem capitalism is a state-formation of the
machine made flesh. The individual within the capitalist State does not use the machine
but is the machine—and not in a post-modem “cyborg” manner, either. For the “cyborg”
is the hybrid o f human and machine—humans are not part machine, they are fully
machine... they are robots. The term “robot” after all, originally meant “worker” and
was employed in science fiction as a metaphor for the machine-like nature of workers.41
And this is no utopian metaphor, as that of the “cyborg”; rather, it is a dystopian truth.
The State has always been a social machine and so it was only logical for the State
to culminate in Capitalism, the era of the machine. Technological machines are
everywhere, bureaucratic machines utilize these technical machines, and the humanmachine is the singular unit. All of these micro-machines work the vast machine of the
State, allowing capital to flow as its electricity.
In the early days of capitalism, Marx believed that the debilitating affects of work,
under the factory machine, would cause the workers to eventually throw off their chains.
But Marx was only aware of a world of labour where the machine was not yet fully born.
How can the worker overcome the repressive machine when the worker is a micro-

40 Deleuze and Guattari, 1000 Plateaus, p. 457.
41 The “robot” was first created by science-fiction novelist Copek in his book R.U.R.
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machine which, in turn, is a component of the mega-machine—the socius? Moreover, the
worker is not only the individual upon the factory floor, but the privileged student in the
classroom, no less commodified, as we have just seen. The apparatus of capture revealed
as machinic enslavement, according to Deleuze and Guattari, underlies the entire w orldthe assemblage o f machines enlivened by capital.
The obvious regimentation and control which machinic enslavement implies,
however, will be discussed in the next chapter. Here I want to focus on the notion of the
capitalist apparatus of capture as a whole and how it is reflected by the university. The
switch to a capitalist system, as Deleuze and Guattari have noted, created the illusion that
free labour and independent capital overpowered the State, replacing it with the market.
No doubt influenced by this concept of freedom, the liberal university’s philosophy is
similar in that its agenda is to form “the man” and not “the citizen”42 —an individual who
receives an education free of State concerns and is not taught as a mere member of this
State. The capitalist system, however, merely changed the form of the State into that of a
capitalist state; the market has become the dictator, and it is to this market that one must
become subject if one is to be a proper citizen.43 Therefore, the liberal university’s
“promotion of the best possible realization of humanity as humanity”44, is ultimately
aimed at a “social efficiency”45 which is the governing imperative of the socius of
capitalism. Hence, the student is still captured as a citizen, but as a different kind of
citizen.

42 Dewey, p. 93.
4’ This being said, I realize that not all meaning is dictated by the market. But under a fascist dictatorship
there is always a space o f dissent, a line o f flight from the political regime.

44 Dewey, p. 95.
45 ibid., p. 119.
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Furthermore, the process of machinic enslavement exists within the university as
the method of forming this free citizen, for “information... is also the property of the
States that set themselves up as humans-machines systems.”46 The university as
apparatus of capture is the land (ruled by the administration and the professor), work
(defined by papers and exams), and money (defined by tuition, interest on student loans,
and increasing privatisation). Defined by these three factors, the university also supports
“the capitalist mode of production itself’, and thus by controlling information,
stratification, and specialization it can place students within different faculties which are
assigned importance due to their overall relation to the socius. Faculties like the arts are
ascribed lesser value than the sciences and economics. The flows of capital which
animate the university apparatus reveal this machinic processing. More of this social
electricity is directed at what the capitalist State designates as possessing greater
“instrumental value” 47 It is because of this fact that “it is the economic rather than the
theoretical role of the university which is predominant.”48 Any examination of the
corporate-university partnership, after all, reveals this predominance o f economic interest:
In this new academic order, basic research is sacrificed to
applied programs of immediate benefit to the corporate
structure.
Research parks, priviate-sector liaisons...
Moneys subtracted from base operating budgets are
reinjected back into programs of direct utility to hightechnology capital.49
Since the university functions as an apparatus of capture, then, a structure of
enslavement exists that allows the process of alienation to function adequately. As an

46 Deleuze and Guattari,

1000 Plateaus, p. 458.

47 Dewey, p. 243.
48 Cohn-Bendit, p. 43.
49 Dyer-Witheford, p. 110.
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apparatus of capture, after all, the university functions in a similar manner to the
apparatus of the average workplace: “education [is] just as much [a part] of capital... as is
the most elementary labour of the worker.”50 The student must be captured and
commodified so that she can take her place in the economic world, managing or
participating in the flows of capital. Moreover, the fact that the socius is a “humanmachine system”—and this fact is reflected in the university—means that the comparison
between the worker and the student, in the preceding section, is perhaps literally and not
only analogously true; every citizen is a machine.
Finally, this machinic arrangement is evident in the reified structure of the
university institution which exists as a capitalist spectacle affecting social separations—a
capitalist delirium. While the preceding section examined the student, and this section
examined the general institution, the following two sections—concerning, respectively,
Lukacs and Debord—will analyze the relation of the commodified student to the
university apparatus of capture.

Reification
In the first section of this chapter, the student was likened to Marx’s alienated
worker. In the preceding section the concept of the apparatus of capture was analyzed in
relation to the university. Deleuze and Guattari capture the essential structure of the
commodified student, but the exact relation between student and institution still needs to
be discussed. This force of commodification and capitalist socialization is a problem in
so far as the university presents itself as a free institution. But “there is no problem,”
writes Georg Lukacs, “ .. .and there is no solution [to this problem] that could not be
found in the solution to the riddle of commodity-structure,”^ In the socius of capitalism,
50 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 234.
51 Lukacs, p. 83.
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society is founded on the structure of the commodity and the university is, as an apparatus
of capture, merely another institution that replicates this commodity-structure. The
relation of the student to this apparatus, however, is evident in the reified structure of the
university. It is important to investigate the meaning of Lukacs theory in light of Deleuze
and Guattari’s apparatus o f capture and how it relates to the university system.
The basis o f commodity-structure is, for Lukacs, reification. As he defines it,
reification is:
a relation between people [that] takes on the character of a
thing and thus acquires a ‘phantom objectivity’, an
autonomy that seems so strictly rational and all-embracing
as to conceal every trace of its fundamental nature: the
relation between people.52
This reification is primarily evident in the capitalist market but, since the university is a
reflection of the capitalist system, reification appears in this institution as well. Lukacs
antipates this fact when he writes, “the commodity structure [has] penetrate[d] society in
all its aspects and [has] remould[ed] it in its own image.”53
This universal category of the commodity is evident in the university both
subjectively and objectively. Subjectively, as we have seen, the university student has
sunk to the level o f the commodity. Objectively, the university appears as “a world of
objects and relations between things’,54-th e world of the market reflected in the
university bureaucracy, administration, and academic structure. The knowledge a student
possesses about the laws of administration and proper academic procedure may be used
“to his own advantage but he is not able to modify the process by his own activity.”55
52 ibid.
53 ibid., p. 85.
54 ibid., p. 87.
55 ibid.
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Once again, the student possesses a measure of liberty within the university institution,
but is ultimately bound by its rules.
Thus we discover a student that has been captured within a world of social
relations that have become things. The regulation and structure of the university is, in
reality, nothing more than a reflection of social relations. In the university, specialization
and rationalization are manifested in an apparatus of capture with “a continuous trend
towards greater rationalisation”56 and specialization. We could describe this as a trend
towards machinic enslavement. The educational process in itself is nothing more than a
social relation between a teacher and a student. But when the capitalist university
administration organizes this process it becomes a specialized a system with its own rules
and regulations—bureaucratic procedures, channels of authority, and the fragmentation
and categorization of knowledge (the faculties of Science, departments of Philosophy,
etc.). This rationalized fragmentation of the object into various specialized fields “entails
the fragmentation o f its subject”57, the student. The student, then, does not appear as an
agent of his own education; he “is a mechanical part incorporated into a mechanical
system”58 which appears as if it is “pre-existing and self-sufficient, it functions
independently o f him and he has to conform to its laws whether he likes it or not.”59
Furthermore, the student is taught that “the fate of the worker [has become] the
fate of society as a whole”60 in that her education is always presented to her as a tool for
which to get ajo b -th a t education is only about the job market. Thus the students are
captured as workers, managers, or the next generation of professors. For although not
56 ibid., p. 88.
57 ibid., p. 89.
58 ibid.
59 ibid.
60 ibid., p. 91.
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every faculty promotes social integration, the academic structure demands it: loans need
to be repaid, and degrees retain the identity of an exchange value. To continue “putting
off the real world” (for the real world is always the world of work, not its shadow) one
must confront a reified, bureaucratic and academic structure: it is easier to leave and find
ajob than proceed to graduate school. Thus the socius depends on the university for “the
emergence of the ‘free’ worker who is able to take his [education] to market and offer it
for sale as a commodity ‘belonging’ to him, a thing that he ‘possesses’.”61
In terms o f commodification and machinic enslavement, social relations have
become things precisely because the modem student, like the modem worker, is a thing, a
robot. The apparatus o f capture ensures that students will become cogs in the capitalist
machine, creating “a form for the state and a system of law corresponding to its needs and
harmonising with its own structure.”62 The apparatus of capture is evident in the fact
that the university is ingrained “more fatefully and more definitively in the consciousness
of [the student]”63—it has become reified. In this manner it tmly seems to emanate from
the capitalist recording process as part of a “unified structure of consciousness that
embraced the whole society, brought it into being.”64 This structure is the economic
structure, the commodity-structure, of the capitalist State.

Spectacular society
With the reified university standing over and above the student, the student
becomes involved in a process of spectacular separation from the very institution within
which she was supposed to be engaged. “In societies where modem conditions of
61 ibid.
62 ibid., p. 95
63 ibid., p. 93.
64 ibid., p. 100.
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production prevail,” writes Guy Debord, “all of life presents itself as an immense
accumulation o f spectacles .”65 Debord’s concept of the spectacle is the theoretical child
of Marx and Lukacs—an expansion on the themes of commodification and reification.
For Debord, spectacular society implies that “[ejverything that was directly lived has
moved away into a representation”66 due to the accumulation of image-objects which
affect social separation. Such an analysis of society, however, should not be construed as
a media critique (the “spectacle” only referring to something like television). Although
the media may be part o f social separation, the spectacle “cannot be understood as an
abuse of the world o f vision, as a product of the techniques of mass dissemination of
images.”67
Rather, the concept of the spectacle, for Debord, is a key concept to understanding
the socius. It is Lukacs’ idea of reification expanded to encompass the social whole.
With the commodity penetrating all aspects of life, the capitalist world vision has become
integrated with and made identical to reality. (As Deleuze and Guattari claim, capitalism
has become a delirium; it is true consciousness of a false reality, or a dream of the
commodity which is masquerading as reality.) Thus, “[tjhe spectacle form and content
are identically the total justification of the existing system’s conditions and goals.”68
Debord defines the spectacle as “not a collection of images, but a social relation among
people, mediated by images.”69 In other words, the images of commodities and capital
have defined reality and constructed “its own delirium by recording the process of

65 Debord, Society o f the Spectacle, 1.
66 ibid.
67 ibid., 5.
68 ibid., 6.
69 ibid., 4.
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production”.70 As we can see, Debord’s position is a clear extension of Lukacs’ concept
of reification.
The liberal university is, as an apparatus of capture, a spectacle; “it is specifically
the sector which concentrates all gazing and consciousness.”71 Primarily the university is
a social relation among people, but its reified nature is maintained by the mediation of
images. Once again, these “images” should not be misunderstood as media
representations (although, in spectacular society at large, such representations are a type
of image), but as image-objects: information and education which reflect and disseminate
capitalist ideology—the capitalist imagination, the social delirium. Although a certain
critical freedom is permissible, and even promoted, within the university, the institution’s
nature as an apparatus of capture is such that “there remains nothing... which has not
been transformed, and polluted, according to the means and interests of modem
industry.”72 Since modem industry is not a necessary cause of our existence—but we
believe it is so because it has been reified—it has, indeed, polluted the whole of life.
Therefore, the information one absorbs within the university gains its social importance
from the rules of the socius: from how it aids social integration 73 So you ’re studying
philosophy? Whatjo b will that get you? The option of this educational process is
presented in the following manner: either your education gets you a job, or your education
is worthless. (I will argue in the third chapter that this assertion is not an overstatement
but the truth of the current educational model.)

70 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 10.
71 Debord, Society o f the Spectacle, 3.
72 Debord, Comments on the Society o f the Spectacle, p. 10.
73 This fact shall be illuminated further in the Chapter which discusses “knowledge-capital” .
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For Debord, the capitalist market has accomplished “the globalisation of the
false... [and] the falsification of the globe”74 through spectacular domination. The vast
majority of information, no matter what its nature, may be appropriated by the socius and
used to separate people into spectators of capitalism, integrating them into the socius.
Thus, although the university maintains an inner core of critical freedom, the spectacle
nature of the institution isolates and assassinates this freedom. Information which
contains a radical agenda, for example, can by rendered impotent by the ‘free’ discourse
of liberalism—by being transformed into a representation of itself, a mere category of
critical knowledge the same as any other category: “the Frankfurt School”, “Third-World
Marxism”, “Feminism”, “Post-colonial studies”, etc. Literature that contains a radical
critique, then, is reduced to a theoretical image of its original intent. A social separation,
therefore, is affected amongst students and their education. It is possible, as a university
student, to be a “Marxist” and a capitalist at the same time. One can use revolutionary
thought as a theoretical construct for mere criticism, locking up the social critique within
the realm of the imagination. It is for this reason that “[r] evolutionary theory is now the
enemy of all revolutionary ideology”.75
The freedom found in the liberal university, then, is a freedom of contemplation
surrounded by machinic enslavement. It is a freedom that must follow the rules of the
apparatus of capture. Thus, Deleuze and Guattari could write their social critiques within
the university institution as long as these critiques followed the rules of this institution,
using the language o f the spectacle which “consists of signs of the ruling production,
which at the same time are the ultimate goal of this production.”76 This fact also explains
why I can write this paper; the spectacle is such that, “[w]hen analyzing the spectacle one
74 Debord, Comments..., p. 10.
75 Debord, Society o f the Spectacle, 124.
76 ibid., 7.
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speaks to some extent, the language of the spectacular itself’77, reinforcing its power by
moving through its methodological territory. Through the university, then, “the
spectacle’s domination has succeeded in raising a whole generation molded to its laws.”78
Finally, the separation perfected by the mediation of images is evident in the
alienation and commodification of the student discussed in the first section of this
chapter: the students have been separated from other students and from their very selves.
Moreover, spectacular society separates individuals in order to reduce them to specific
machine cogs for the socius: university specialisation captures students as managers,
engineers, computer programmers, scientists, in order to maintain the overall system.
And the “success o f [this] economic system of separation is the proletarianization of the
world.”79

Increasing corporatisation
The reified spectacle of the university apparatus of capture can be empirically
confirmed by examining the increasingly corporate structure of the university. “By
1900,” writes Stanley Aronowitz in his study The Knowledge Factory, “the universitycorporate complex was in full bloom. The two aspects of this relationship, that
universities adopt the business ethic and more directly serve business by training cadres
for industry was well described by contemporary observers”80 Since the beginning of the
twentieth century, then, “the trend toward integration of the university and [capitalist]

77 ibid., 9.
78 Debord, Comments..., p. 7.
79 Debord, Society o f the Spectacle, 26.
80 Aronowitz, p. 16-17.
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society [became] irreversible and desirable.”81 Indeed, one can confirm Aronowitz’s
observations by examining the discourses of the defenders of business and capital.
One key illustration is Renovating the Ivory Tower, an empirical study by various
authors which is edited by David Laidler, a “Bank of Montreal Professor at the University
of Western Ontario” and a member of the “Canadian Bankers Association”.82 The object
of this book is to discuss university policy in light of the knowledge economy. Although
Laidler’s study is driven by an ideology which is antithetical to the idea of the university
as a site of critical inquiry, the information contained within its pages is invaluable.
Furthermore, even though these are not the only participants in the university debate they
are a paradigmatic example of the current strain of liberal educational theory and, as the
study itself attests, are also paradigmatic of the group that holds the most influence.
Laidler and his contributors agree (and produce research to prove) that the university “is
committed to developing and enhancing human capital”83, but they believe this
commitment is justified. They believe, like Dewey, that the university must exist as a
training ground for social integration and efficiency. Thus, “the increasing
rationalisation” warned of by Lukacs is accepted by Laidler and his associates and,
indeed, promoted. The majority of this study, then, is aimed at investigating how the
university contributes to the GDP through the production of human capital. Numerous
figures throughout the study84 reveal that the university’s participation in the economy
has grown, especially in the United States. As Canadian economists, the contributors of
Laidler’s study champion the US model, claiming that Canadian universities, although

81 ibid., p. 34.
82 Laidler, back cover.
83 Laidler, p. 80.
84 see, for example, p. 51-52 concerning economic standards of living.
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proceeding along the same lines as their neighbours, need to become more like their
American counterparts.
Examining the financial state of the university, Laidler claims in his introduction
that, while these institutions “are certainly under considerable financial pressure... if they
are to receive more resources, it must be shown that the money would be well spent.”85
By “well spent” Laidler means spent on what he perceives to be the important areas of
education (business, computers, engineering, scientific research) which will cause a
greater output of human capital than is presently taking place:
the spectacular... economic performance of the 1990s was
the result of developments in high-technology activities
[and] is well grounded in fact. And because these activities
involve using highly educated workers to exploit new
developments in science and engineering, it is
understandable that another popular notion has developed—
namely, that the key to securing a rising standard of living at
the turn o f the millennium lies in the creation and
dissemination of knowledge.86
Laidler’s focus on exploiting scientific developments is merely an echo of Dewey’s call
for controlling the technological reality. But while Dewey desired a holistic form of
education that included a diversity of faculties, Laidler and his associates, although
granting that the liberal university already has economic worth want to refocus the
university on only those faculties that can justify themselves economically. The ‘liberal
model’ for the Laidler crew appears to mean something different than it does for Dewey;
while Dewey’s model was concerned with the cultivation of the citizen, the former
group’s model is concerned with economic programming.

85 Laidler, p. 6.
86 ibid., p. 7.
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Although the authors of the Laidler study see themselves as part of the liberal
education tradition, their concern with economic programming is perhaps due to the
influence of concepts they have borrowed from the “information revolution” or
“postindustrialism”, an ideology championed by neo-liberal academics like Daniel Bell
and Alvin Toffler. This specific ideology claims that “[t]he most important agents in this
postindustrial society would be scientists, engineeers, and administrators, a new
‘knowledge class’ lodged primarily within government and academia, bearers of the
rationalist skills and virtues required by increasing organizational and technological
complexity.”87 The Laidler study’s obsession with the knowledge economy is a result of
this “information revolution” influence, yet is not divorced from the liberal project
represented by Dewey. For just as Dewey desired to create an educational model that
would improve society, so postindustrialism desires to “create an epoch of rationalized
integration and prosperity, which, while not without its own problems, would finally
escape from the material want, economic crisis, and class conflict of the industrial era.”88
In light of this postindustrialist ideology, Laidler’s study argues that, “the concept
of human capital has been central to the economic analysis of education for about 40
years,” and yet goes on to say that in places like Canada the production of human capital
is lagging behind. Moreover, this study argues that increasing corporatization, and
funding for the areas deemed important by business, is what liberal education was
supposed to be about to begin with:
The ‘new economy’ is said to be a ‘knowledge economy’,
and within it, universities [have been] presented as having
special roles to play as creators of new ideas in their
research function and as producers of human capital
87 Dyer-Witheford, p. 18. The ideology of postindustrialism and its relation to liberalism/neo
liberalism is both summarized in Dyer-Witheford’s book, and exposed for being the ideology that
helped lay the foundations for the current era of capitalism.
88 ibid.
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capable of exploiting those ideas in their teaching function.
In this way o f looking at things, the output of universities is
a vital input into the material progress of the market
economy.89
This connection illustrates precisely what I mean by the university being an apparatus of
capture: it produces commodified students in order to capture them for the market
economy as “human capital.” Associating Lukacs’ concept of the ‘free’ worker with the
student, then, is not a misleading analogy. Laidler himself maintains that the university is
aimed at “the emergence of the ‘free’ worker who is able to take his [education] to market
and offer it for sale as a commodity ‘belonging’ to him, a thing that he ‘possesses’.”90
Furthermore, due to the fact that Laidler’s study assumes the university’s
traditional liberal role, it just takes as given that “the role of universities... [is] to produce
both human and knowledge capital that yields significant private returns.”91 Laidler’s
study also illustrates what I mean by reification: a “phantom objectivity” has been given
to the university as an economic machine, and nowhere in Laidler’s study is this
economic identity even questioned. Laidler also uses the term “knowledge capital”
without irony, apparently oblivious to the fact that Deleuze and Guattari were using it
nearly forty years earlier in Anti-Oedipus in order to critique the liberal educational
system—forty years which mirrors Laidler’s own historical claim, mentioned above, about
the concept of human capital being an intrinsic part of educational theory for the last four
decades. For Laidler, then, increasing corporatization has been happening for around four
decades and he and his associates gleefully predict that it will and should continue.
It is with this economic study in mind that the aforementioned study by Aronowitz
can assert that “the university has become virtually identical with the transnational
89 Laidler, p. 8.
90 ibid.
91 ibid., p. 36.
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corporations ... that serve as a kind of surrogate state.”92 If the university is becoming a
business venture, then the interests of capital have become unified with education. This
change is what allows Laidler and his associates to refer to the university as an institution
in the “knowledge economy,” and to students as “human capital.”
Furthermore, the commodification of the student and her education is evident in
the increasing automation of this “knowledge economy”. In Digital Diploma Mills,
author David Noble examines the increase of online university education. He contends
that these online courses are, in essence, “the commodification of higher education, of
which computer technology is merely the latest medium”.93 Online education is a
lucrative enterprise for a number of reasons: the students can be kept from a campus
which requires, among many things, building and grounds maintenance, and professors
can be reduced to cheap commodity status as well. This trend of educational automation
ultimately adds to the students’ alienation:
[the students’ education is] removed or ‘alienated’ from
[its] original context, the actual education process itself,
and from [its] producers, the teachers, and [is] assembled as
‘courses’, which take on an existence independent of and
apart from those who gave [it] flesh... The alienation of
ownership of and control over course material (through
surrender of copyright) is crucial to this step.94
This increasing trend o f the automation of the university, then, is a contemporary
example of how the university reflects and harbours the interests of capital. The
alienation and commodification of the student is accomplished by enslaving her to a
machine-the computer—just like a factory worker. Spectacular social separation will be
perfected through online education. Students will be separated into commodified spaces
92 Aronowitz, p. 6.
93 Noble, p. 1.
94 ibid., p. 3.
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along with their teachers, and the whole institution will run like a factory: “speedup,
routinization of work, greater work discipline and managerial supervision... Thus, the
commoditization of instruction leads invariably to the ‘'proletarianization ’ [of the
university]”95 an inevitability since, according to Debord, the whole world is becoming
proletarianized under the forces of capitalism—all societal positions are becoming part of
the oppressed class.
It is these forces of capitalism, then, that underlie the increase of university
automation as an apparatus of capture. Machinic enslavement becomes even more
evident as the students confront a reified education through their computers—reified
because it is no longer dependent upon the social relations between professors and
students. That relation is abstracted into icons and hypertext on a screen. Although the
relation between professors and students contributes to alienation, the professor class in
some cases buffers the complete capitalist control of the administration. Enslavement
increases, then, with the elimination of the professors and the subjection of the students to
just the administration. Thus the university reflects the working world and students can
be easily trained—captured—in order to take their place in the spectacular economic
reality. Therefore, university automation is just another example which proves that, “as
universities have become corporate in their structure as well as in their curriculum, they
advance the indeterminate goal of ‘excellence’ to which the [transnational corporations]
are pledged.”96
The alienation, commodification, and enslavement of the student under the reified
capitalistic apparatus of this “knowledge economy”, however, should not obscure another
question: who is being denied education? As aforementioned, the liberal university is
populated, mainly, by the privileged classes-it would be a mistake to “revel in [student]
95 Noble, p. 4, emphasis added.
96 Aronowitz, p. 6.
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alienation... attracting] the sympathy of a society indifferent to much more poignant
suffering throughout the world.”97
University education is, first and foremost, a privilege of the developed countries.
But obviously there are those in these developed countries, despite student loans, who
cannot afford university education. Furthermore, there are those whose life and social
setting provide them with sub-standard public education, and they are forced to compete
with students who have access to private high schools and who do not need to work to
afford to live, or scrape together the large amount of money required for university
tuition. The implications of this fact extend further than admission to the university. The
less wealthy the student, the more she must work to continue her worth as a commodified
student. Increasing tuition rates and threats of privatisation will make this reality even
worse. The liberal model of the university is constructed for the wealthy and, hence,
affects the freedom o f the underprivileged.
What should be noted at this point, then, is that, although university is aimed at
the privileged classes, these privileged students are produced as privileged commodities,
that is, the next generation of bosses:
[the university’s] function is to condition students so that
they will fit into the economic and social system, as mere
puppets dancing to the tune of technocrats, of men busily
organizing the misery of the underdeveloped countries and
the affluence of the rest.98
Therefore, although the majority of students’ commodity status is privileged they are in a
similar conceptual status as the underprivileged; they are socialized and inserted into their
proper position in order to maintain the overall system. Maintaining the system means
organizing and recording “the flows of code” that keep the capitalist reality functioning.
97 Cohn-Bendit, p. 26.
98 ibid., p. 30.
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And perhaps this is what Guy Debord means when he writes of a proletarianization o f the
world due to “growing capitalist alienation at all levels”.99

Conclusion
The fact that North American university education is fast becoming a profitoriented institution is a result of its existence as part of the capitalist socius. And in this
chapter I have examined the university as a capitalist institution by applying Marx’s
concept of alienation to the student, expanded upon that analogy with the concepts of
apparatus of capture, reification, and spectacular society, and—to a certain degree—•
empirically illustrated my argument. It is this capitalist nature of the university which not
only alienates the students and professors but which, through tuition hikes, a privilege for
the elite—an elite that, under the forces of capitalism, is socialized, processed, and
controlled.

99 Debord, Society o f the Spectacle, 122.
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CHAPTER TWO
regimentation and control
society f o i l o f prisons... Anything else which is
outside o f the needs o f the capitalist society are given
no place. The great many people who can no longer
live here, or who no longer want to-and there are
many people who choose to end their lives every day—
speak o f the emptiness o f the system and the hardness
in the society.”
“A

Red Army Faction, Statement o f the RAF
(the 1998 disbanding o f the R ed Arm y
Faction)

Introduction
As discussed in the previous chapter, the university is an apparatus of capture that,
through processes o f alienation and reification, binds the student to capitalism. With
social and economic integration as this institution’s general aim, the university produces a
student commodity that is regimented in such a way so as to fit into the structure of
society. This institution “chum[s] out the trained personnel that is so essential for
bureaucratic capitalism.”1 The aim of this chapter is to examine the capitalist
regimentation which exists within the liberal university.
To begin, let us return to Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of machinic enslavement.
As an apparatus of capture, the university captures the student commodity in order to bind
her to the economic reality of capitalist society. This aim was evident in the philosophy
of Dewey, in his claim that the general aim of education is “social efficiency... [and] the
importance of industrial competency.”2 It was reiterated in the Laidler study through its
analysis of the student as “human capital”. The mode of capture by which the current
socius defines its citizens is machinic enslavement, “the reinvention of a machine of
which human beings are constituent parts, instead of subjected workers or users.”3 The
1 Cohn-Bendit, p. 41.

2 Dewey, p. 119.
3 Deleuze and Guattari, 1000 Plateaus, p. 458.
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student is captured as a micro-machine—a robot—and is thus easily regimented and
controlled. This machine is always programmable, upgradeable, fixable, and arrangeable.
Furthermore, a machine is ultimately profitable because it fits into a socius, which
is nothing but a composition of similar machines. In other words, the socius only permits
machines that it can integrate seamlessly; one machine can always replace another. Those
trained at universities are, by and large, trained in order to fit into the social machine
which, in turn, profits from their machinic nature: they are already regimented and
trained. They already possess the proper work ethic. In this chapter I will further
develop the notion of machinic enslavement through Foucault’s theories of discipline,
which will form a general description of regimentation. Behind the general process of
discipline and regimentation in the university, however, is the face of capitalism. In the
second section I will elaborate on the concepts of discipline with Deleuze and Guattari’s
concept offaciality. The third section will discuss Debord’s analysis of capitalist space
and will examine how the actual territory of the university is regimented and disciplined
by the face of capitalism. The fourth and final section o f this chapter will deal with the
regimentation o f educational information itself.

Discipline
The university is a disciplinary institution in two senses. First o f all, students are
trained to aim themselves at a discipline, that is, an area of study or a vocation.
Discipline should not be misunderstood as some form of parental punishment (although
this may overlap), but in terms of regimentation and control. Secondly, the student
regiments or disciplines herself in order to succeed within the university. That is, she
trains herself in a discipline (science, history, mathematics, philosophy, etc.). It was
Foucault who first defined discipline in this way. In Discipline & Punish Foucault writes:
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The exercise o f discipline presupposes a mechanism that
coerces by means of observation; an apparatus in which the
techniques that make it possible to see induce effects of
power, and in which, conversely, the means of coercion
make those on whom they are applied clearly visible.4
As the first chapter discussed, the university is such a mechanism since it exists as an
“apparatus” of capture. The regimentation o f this institution is clearly visible in the sense
that many o f those whom it captures for the socius are products of their education: the
scientist, the lawyer, the medical doctor, the historian, etc. As graduates, they practice a
discipline.
In this section I will examine aspects ofFoucault’s theory of discipline in relation
to the liberal university. I do not, however, wish to get bogged down in a discussion of
Foucault’s genealogical method that informs his concepts. Rather than investigating
discipline in light of the history of power/knowledge, I will investigate certain areas of
Discipline & Punish in light of “the reinvention of a machine of which human beings are
constituent parts”. In order to analyze Foucault in this specific manner, I will focus on
the following areas: the art o f distributions, the control o f activity, the organization o f
geneses, and the composition o f forces. Finally, this section will conclude with the
disciplinary function of the examination.
Discipline, for Foucault, “proceeds from the distribution of individuals in space”5
and, therefore, requires a number of techniques. This distribution is first defined by an
enclosure which serves as a “protected place of disciplinary monotony”.6 In regards to
the university, such an enclosure is the space in which the university exists—the campus—
which encloses the buildings of this institution. Furthermore, this enclosure needs

4 Foucault, p. 171.
5 ibid., p. 141.
6 ibid.
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machinery that will regiment the individuals within the space by divisions and
compartments—rows o f desks, for example. Disciplinary space also requires functional
sites7 that are given specific regimental uses. Examples of these sites are the professors’
offices, different classrooms, and different faculties. Out of this fiinctionalization certain
useful spaces are bom: the university classroom, for example, serves the specific function
of lecturing (if one is the professor) and listening (if one is the student). Although it is
true that teaching practices might occasionally differ, this lecture-listen method of
teaching—what Freire calls the banking method of teaching (which turn students into
‘“receptacles’ to be ‘filled’ by the teacher”8)—is the normal function of the disciplinary
space of the classroom. Finally, discipline distributes itself as an “art of rank”9 by
creating “a network of relations”10: the professor, the graduate student, the student, and
the secretary, for example, all possess different modes of relating to one another.
Different rituals of discourse evolve between these occupations determined by relative
positions in the hierarchy.
The second general function of discipline is the control of activity. One method
of control is the time-table that teaches one to discipline and regiment one’s time. This
scheduling has obviously taken root in the university when one considers the time-tables
students must create for themselves each year, scheduling classes into their proper spots,
“establishing] rhythms... regulat[ing] the cycles of repetition”.11 Another method of
activity control is the temporal elaboration o f the act12 in which the repetition of activity
7 ibid., p. 143.
8 Freire, p. 53.
9 Foucault, p. 146.
10 ibid.
11 ibid., p. 149.
12 ibid. p. 151.
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over time produces a type o f specialization. The student, for example, learns to elaborate
her writing style by continuous essay writing and rewriting. Although Foucault discusses
two other methods by which activity is controlled,13 these do not really relate to the
university institution, and so I will just discuss one more: exhaustive use.14 Under this
principle of activity discipline we find the idea of “positive economy”15 —the student
should use time wisely, should study whenever possible, and should fill up her schedule
with activities that appear impressive on a graduate school, grant, or job application.
The next general function of discipline for Foucault is the organization of
geneses—of categories, of divisions-where “[t]he [aforementioned] disciplines, which
analyse space, break up and rearrange activities, must also be understood as machinery
for adding up and capitalizing time.”16 As a whole, the university institution is organized
in such a way as to manage student distribution and activity in a profitable manner.
Degrees are general time markers which represent student turn-over: as students leave
university in order to be integrated into the economic world, the institution receives more
capital from arriving students. Even the worth of professors is organized in this
regimental manner; if they serve their time and do their job properly they may receive
tenure.
Discipline as a whole functions as a composition of forces, “a machine whose
effect will be maximized by the concerted articulation of the elementary parts of which it
is composed.”17 In other words, the disciplinary institution utilizes all of its disciplinary
forces to function as a single machine. Therefore regimentation is no longer mere
13 correlation of the body and the gesture, the body-object articulation.
14 Foucault, p. 154.
15 ibid.
16 ibid., p. 157.
17 ibid., p. 164.
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distribution, but “an efficient machine”18 or, in Deleuze and Guattari’s words, an
apparatus of capture. Within this composition an individual is an element which can be
arranged, along with time, in a machinic sequence. As was evidenced in the first chapter,
the university is one such sequenced machine. Furthermore, “[tjhis carefully measured
combination of forces requires a precise system of command... [in which one perceives a
given] signal and [reacts] to it immediately, according to a more or less artificial,
prearranged code.”19 The entire university runs according to such compositions of
signals. For example, when the clock hand signals a certain time, students react with
nervousness, or when a large package arrives in the mail, say, in answer to some grant
application, students react with happiness, as opposed to the disappointment generated by
a slim envelope. Professors signal their students’ worth with letters and marks, which a
student does not necessarily have to understand but must accept. Certain marks are
recognized as excellent, others mediocre, others merely passing grades (to which many a
student reacts with elation), and still others signal failure. All of the previous forms of
discipline, then, are arranged in order to compose one large apparatus of capture.
Although the university apparatus is not identitical to other institutions or to the state
itself, it plays an integral part, namely, to produce individuals in such a way that their
later insertion into the social machine is as seamless as possible.
Finally, the examination is a form of discipline that “makes it possible to qualify,
to classify and to punish.”20 Methods of university examination regiment students into
quantifiable categories (the honours student, the average student, the failure) and thus
“holds them in a mechanism of objectification.”21 Students are defined by a “field of
18 ibid.
19 ibid., p. 166.
20 ibid., p. 184.

21 ibid., p. 187.
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documentation.”22 Such a process, then, allows for an individual to be formalized within
a structure of power relations. The student knows her place and her worth by the grade
point average examinations create, and bureaucratic documentation develops a permanent
academic record in which the student’s marks will define a field o f possibilities within
which she must navigate. If the grade point average on this record is high than she will
be worthy of grants or continuing education. Obviously, higher academic achievement
does not imply a greater mechanization. Many students may work to score higher in
order to stay within the regimentally bounded world of academic freedom. The problem,
however, is that in order to avoid being integrated fully into the social machine students
have to play an academic game (they have to leap through certain hoops and subject
themselves to a disciplinary procedure). In this manner, the student becomes a “case
which at one and the same time constitutes an object for a branch of knowledge and a
hold for a branch of power.”23 The student is the case or the end product of her
discipline. She is the “effect and object of [the] knowledge”24 that she has accumulated
within the university. All of these methods of discipline, which affect strict
regimentation, might allow one to say, along with Foucault, that “schools... resemble
prisons”.25

Faciality
All methods of discipline and regimentation are based on a face—a signifying
regime that has crystallized into a recognizable system. Faciality, then, refers to a system
that is engendered by recognizable features. “Architecture,” for example, “positions its
22 ibid., p. 189.
23 ibid., p. 191.
24 ibid., p. 192.
25 ibid., p. 228, emphasis added.
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ensembles—houses, towns or cities, monuments or factories—to function like faces in the
landscape they transform.”26 This idea is not to be confused with schools of architecture
or the specific differences between houses and highrises but should rather be understood
as a comment on human psychology and class difference. We construct our world to
resemble ourselves. We project our face everywhere. But just what is this fa c e that we
project upon our world? According to Deleuze and Guattari facia lity always carries a
specific socio-political function. As part of the social machine, we allow our system to
operate as a certain faciality machine.
The aim of this section is to examine Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of faciality,
and how it “reigns materially over that whole constellation of significances and
interpretations”27 which compose the university. In the first chapter the university was
described as a capitalist apparatus of capture, and so the face of the university system
possesses a capitalistic nature. It is important, then, to first examine “the relation of the
face to the... machine that produces it, and the relation o f the face to the assemblages of
power that require that social production. The fa ce is a p o litics. ,,,2S In order to fully
understand the concept of faciality, we must first understand Deleuze and Guattari’s
analysis of the signifying order of capitalism, or the signs capitalism uses to represent the
world. What Deleuze and Guattari refer to as a signifying regime forms the background
for their concept o f faciality, for a face “is a politics” that is formed by the organization
and stratification of a signifying order. Thus, after discussing capitalist representation,
this section will discuss the facialization of this signifying order in regards to the

26 Deleuze and Guattari, 1000 Plateaus, p. 172.
27 ibid., p. 115.
28 ibid., p. 181, emphasis added.
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university apparatus which “produces a particular kind of representation whose elements
are organized at [its] surface”29 as its face.
“Writing,” claim Deleuze and Guattari, “has never been capitalism’s thing.
Capitalism is profoundly illiterate.”30 The signifying order of capitalism, then, is not that
of books (as it was in, for example, a despotic order-books of the law, or religious texts).
Even though capitalism continues to appropriate this order of representation “adapted to
money as the general equivalent”31 it does so as an archaism. The capitalist language,
however, is realized through “the appearance of the technical means of expression”32:
market figures, numerical quantifications, advertising images, etc. The archaic language
system of writing, therefore, is only utilized in so far as it is useful to capitalism’s specific
order (the slogan tied to the commodity image, for example) and only if it serves this
order rather than the rules of writing. I do not want to get sidetracked into the realm of
the philosophy of language, but I think that we can presuppose certain “rules of writing”:
rules of grammar, specific definitions of words, and basic logic are the key to most
written works, especially in the academic vein. Appropriated by the capitalist order of
representation, writing follows the rules of money and market rather than the basic rules
listed above. Expressions which would have, previously, been inane acquire a new
meaning under capitalism (“be an individual, drink Pepsi”), and writing and reading
evoke the language of the market-every day phrases refer the listener to a product (ie.
“nobody’' reminds one of Bad Boy Furniture).

29 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 262,
30 ibid., p. 240.
31 ibid.
32 ibid.
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Thus, the capitalist order of representation, its regime of signs, ‘“ speaks’ only in
the language of signs imposed on it by merchant capital or the axiomatic of the market”.33
Due to this fact, the capitalist system o f signification can always change in response to
market changes, that is, shift its codes in order to allow a “cordoning off of production
through information.”34 The language codes of writing require extra-economic factors,
reasons and justifications to labour, to produce, to educate oneself, etc. The pre-capitalist
states in which writing was important, for example, would base a citizen’s subservience
to the ruler through evidence provided in religious texts: the gods require your
submission. For the epoch of despotism a system o f signs or a regime to affect social
subjection through specific cultural codes was still used to control the citizens. Such a
social subjection, though, was still centred on the rules of writing; one’s submission to
the gods could be ‘proven’ by rhetoric and sophistry. There can be no real consideration
of extra-economic factors in capitalism, however, since the market is the prime
representational order that has been, as discussed in regards to Lukacs, reified. Thus, a
multinational company like Pepsi can glorify the value of individualism at one point
while, at another, sell its product with an appeal to the community of “the Pepsi
generation”. While both the capitalist and pre-capitalist signifying regimes are regimes
that support an apparatus of capture, the regime has changed, and this regime is organized
as the dominant face o f capitalism. In the preceding chapter the rules of capitalist
representation were evident in regards to the economic study produced by Laidler and his
associates. Although their study was a written text, it bore this face of capitalismquantifiable economic figures served as its basis, and this economic basis is never
questioned. Ronald Bogue, a scholar of Deleuze and Guattari, aptly sums up these rules
of the capitalist regime of signs:
33 ibid., p. 241.
34 ibid.
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The capitalist sign, in other words, means nothing, but
simply functions within the economic process as a medium
for transcoding and co-ordinating various components of
the circuit of production, exchange, distribution, and
consumption. A flow of electricity, for example can be
conjoined with a flow of words, a flow of images, a flow of
music, or a flow of digital commands controlling any
number of technical machines; but the conjoined flows
never mean anything.35
In terms of the university, one would expect that the facialized order of
representation found in writing would form the face of this institution. Although the rules
of writing are an important signifying order (for example, the academic essay, the books
on the reading list) these rules are important insofar as they serve the capitalist order.
Social efficiency and economic integration are the rules of the university apparatus, and
the general aim of all o f this writing is to achieve a degree that may be used in exchange
for a job. Moreover, the language of writing is an archaism, because in faculties like the
humanities which promote the most amount of reading and writing are not viewed as
worthy of as much funding. The language of capitalism has categorized the university,
“and in learning [this] language one must to some extent accept the codes—codes of
privilege, power, domination, exclusion, and so on—inherent in the language.”36
The archaism of writing is even more evident when one considers the automation
o f higher education discussed by Noble. Examining the rise of internet university
education, Noble writes, “[ojnce faculty put their course material online... the knowledge
and course design skill embodied in that material is taken out of their possession [and]
transferred to the machinery”.37 The online university replaces writing and academic

35 Bogue, p. 102.
36 ibid., p. 136.
37 Noble, p. 32.
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exchange with the technical signs of capitalism. One works within a digital field which is
a perfect landscape for capitalist commercialization (ie. web advertising) and which
replaces the archaic writing process with a machinic function. The learning process, then,
becomes attached to an economic factor. The method of pedagogy matters less than the
capital that can be generated by this new system. Therefore, online education “herald[s] a
new regime in higher education, one that is taking hold of the nation’s campuses at an
accelerating rate”.38
With the description of the face, the organization of capitalist representation, thus
discussed, we should now examine Deleuze and Guattari’s concept o f faciality—the
function of this organization. Simply put, social machines require the production of faces
that mirror the dominant face in order to build a regime of signs, defining citizens within
an apparatus of capture. In a dictatorship, for example, this facialization is obvious since
there is a “political power operating through the face of the leader (streamers, icons and
photographs).”39 For example, the ideology of Maoism is borne in the face of Mao which
is postered all over Tianenman Square. Or in Imperial Rome, to give another example,
the code of power was demonstrated by the face of Caesar that was stamped on the
official currency. Fundamentally, however, faciality is not “an affair... of ideology but of
economy and the organization of power”40 in any given apparatus of capture. The face of
capitalism is not as literal as the face of the despotic order. For just as the former regime
does not require an obvious structure of codes, so it does not require an obvious face.
Not only is there a dominant face characterizing an apparatus of capture, but there
is a faciality machine which is intrinsic to machinic enslavement, and this machine
“constitutes a facial unit, an elementary face in biunivocal relation with another: it is a
38 ibid., p. 49.
39 Deleuze and Guattari, 1000 Plateaus, p. 175.
40 ibid.
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man or a woman, a rich person or a poor one, an adult or a child, a leader or a subject, ‘an
x or a y’.”41 In other words, the apparatus of capture facializes its citizens on a
functional level for reasons of social control: the rich person is this fa c e (the face of the
“White Man”42?), the poor person is this fa c e (the face of the vagrant or the immigrant,).
“You don’t so much as have a face,” write Deleuze and Guattari, “as slide into one.”43
Your face, your identity, is defined by modes of capitalist representation, and the inner
depth of your personality is emptied into the one-dimensionality o f socially approved
hantom objectivity. Once we recognize its nature as an
The university’s faciality machine operates in a similar manner in that the
insitution represents a facial education in which a faciality is machine contained:
[a] language is always embedded in the faces that announce
its statements... Choices are guided by faces, elements are
organized around faces: a common grammar is never
separable from a facial education.44
The fa c e of a given university is sometimes evident in items like a Course Calendar: the

University o f Windsor’s course calendar, for example, displays a group of smiling, multi
ethnic students who appear confident and successful—we are diverse y e t we w ill be
economically successful.^ But the faciality of a university goes even further; a

university student is given a specific identity and relation to society due to her education.
The Computer Science student, for example, will be the “rich person” whereas the
41 ibid., p. 177.
42 ibid., p. 176.
43 ibid., p. 177.
44 ibid., p. 179.
45 I am reminded of a satirical article on The Onion which was entitle “Black Guy Photoshopped
unto University Calendar”. The article was joking about a university in Illinois that wanted to
appear politically correct, so it photoshopped a black student unto the calendar’s cover, appearing
as if this student was interacting with the dominant white students.
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Literature student will be the “poor person” and whether this ultimately proves false or
not, this is what is implied by the educational institution as demonstrated by a hierarchy
of funding where the sciences are able to get more grants than the arts. Furthermore,
grading further defines the student’s identity and, “given a concrete face, the machine
judges whether it passes or not, whether it goes or not, on the basis of the elementary
facial units.”46
Faciality becomes a method of control because it produces behaviour in
accordance with the norms implicit in the face. The student who loves philosophy yet
gives it up in order to study business is an example of how “the faciality machine... is the
social production of face”47 because this student eventually slides into the face of the
profitable businessman because he feels that jobs are more important than ancient
thinkers. This function is the aspect of machinic enslavement that engenders a politics of
conformity, for “[a]t every moment, the machine rejects faces that do not conform, or
seem suspicious.”48 In terms of the university, those who do not follow specific
guidelines or who attempt something different are punished for their nonconformity, or at
the very least ostracized by their colleagues. And although the university claims that it is
a bastion of free thought, the suspicion of the entire socius will occasionally infiltrate the
educational apparatus. After the September 11th attacks on the World Trade Centre, for
example, numerous professors, in Canada and the U.S., who made critical comments
about American foreign policy have been punished “for allegedly anti-American
statements” and charged with “hate crime”.49 Therefore, the faciality machine of the

46Deleuze and Guattari, 1000 Plateaus, p. 177.
47 ibid., p. 181.
48 ibid., p. 177.
49 Noble, p. 94.
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university tends, as a form o f machinic enslavement, to regiment the identity of its
students within the capitalist regime of signs.

Capitalist space
The functions of discipline discussed by Foucault refer to the regimentation of
space and time (ie. the enclosure, the control of activity, etc.), and Deleuze and Guattari’s
concept of faciality explains the regime of signs or the capitalist mode o f representation
which guides these forms o f control. Since the face of capitalism lies behind the methods
of control within the university the very territory of the university exists as capitalist
space. In other words, it is the shadow of a socius where “[cjapitalist production has
unified space.”50 Using Debord’s analysis of territory this section of this chapter will
examine the concept o f capitalist space, its existence within the university, and how it
aids the process of regimental social integration.
With the power o f a world wide market ruling as “one vast machine, extending
over the planet”51, the capitalist commodity has been able to “break down all regional and
legal barriers” and continues to erode “corporative restrictions”52 in the interest of forging
a unified, market space. Chapter 11 ofNAFTA, for example, allows corporations to sue
countries. “This unification,” writes Debord, “is at the same time an extensive and
intensive process of banalization,,5Z because the market reduces all cultural realities into
one capitalist reality, one delirium. The concept of a single monolithic capitalist reality
returns us to Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of the deterritorialized state—&“worldwide
axiomatic [which], instead of resulting from heterogeneous social formations and their
50 Debord, Society of the Spectacle, 165.
51 Guattari and Negri, p. 7.
52 Debord, Society o f the Spectacle, 165.
53 ibid.
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relations... determines their relations”54 and appears to eradicate the territories of the
State. The truth, o f course, is that State territories, under capitalism, “are not canceled out
but change form and take on a new meaning”55, and capitalism becomes the new unified
territory.
For Guy Debord, though, this unified territory is not merely confined to
commodity exchange. It is physically evident in the architecture and geography of
modem society. In other words, territory itse lf is regimented in a capitalist manner, just
as it was organized and disciplined in other manners in previous State realities. For
example, “[t]he concern to have open spaces allowing for the rapid circulation of troops
and the use of artillery against insurrections”56 was the basis for urban construction in
previous societies (specifally, Hausmann’s reconstruction o f Paris). Capitalism, however,
creates new urban renewal plans and territorial reconstructions in order to allow traffic to
circulate smoothly in an increasing quantity:
This present abundance of private cars is nothing but the
result of the constant propaganda by which capitalist
production persuades the masses... that the possession of a
car is one of the privileges our society reserves for its
privileged members.57
Traffic, for Debord, is a paradigm example of capitalist territorial design.
Although there are other capitalist factors behind spatial construction, traffic represents
the movement of commodities and capital. People purchase vehicles because the
geography demands it. Roads are provided, vehicles ensure the profit of oil corporations,
and they circulate their drivers and passengers to stores and jobs—purchasing and
54 Deleuze and Guattari, 1000 Plateaus , p. 454.
55 ibid.
56 Debord, “Introduction to a Critique of Urban Geography”, p. 5.
57 ibid.
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producing-in a constant cycle. Traffic is ever present, ensuring a continuous commodity
exchange. The private vehicle is not merely a means of transportation, it is an “essential
product of the capitalist market... American economic prosperity is soon going depend
on the success o f the slogan ‘two cars per family’.”58 The profitability o f traffic is such
that cities and universities demolish buildings in order to construct parking lots and
freeways.
Beyond the notion of traffic is the idea of human circulation. City roads,
highways, airlines, and institutions like shopping centres exist in order to eliminate
geographical distance between hubs of production and consumption. One can work at a
store in the mall and spend money at the food court for lunch. “This society which
eliminates geographical distance reproduces distance internally as spectacular
separation.”59 Individuals constantly circulate with other individuals, but there is barely
any camaraderie: they are separated by their cars, or they are separated by their tasks of
“frenzied consumption”60.
Able to make “the totality of space into its own setting"^, capitalism can replicate
its territory in any institution, claiming this institution as its own—as a unified part of the
socius. Applying these concepts to the university, the spatial arrangement of the
university is conducive to capitalism. University geography is regimented in order to
ensure the human circulation of production and consumption: there is a Tim Hortons™ in
a large number of buildings at UWO, for example, and every university possesses a food
court. Many possess mini-malls. Between work and class, students circulate from
consumption centre to consumption centre, and the space has been constructed in order to
58 Debord, “Situationist Theses on Traffic”, p. 56.
59 Debord, Society o f the Spectacle, 167.
60 ibid., 174.
61 ibid., 169.
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make consumption easier (the disappearance of water fountains so as to encourage drink
purchasing, for example). Furthermore, roads cut through most university campuses and
parking lots abound. Cars are encouraged. When you are finished class you can
conveniently return to your job.
Human circulation within the university, however, has another dimension. There
is a constant flow o f human traffic entering and exiting the gates of university
registration. Since capitalism has unified all spaces, the exiting student can leave
university territory in order to smoothly enter professional territory. Both are economic
territory, and therefore capitalist space. The university is a small city, a shadow of the
capitalist urban landscape:
The major change to befall universities over the last two
decades has been the identification of the campus as a
significant site of capital accumulation, a change in social
perception that has resulted in the systematic conversion of
intellectual activity into intellectual capital and, hence,
intellectual property.62
Moreover, university buildings, as nodes of human circulation, are themselves
capitalist spaces, that is, sites of production and consumption. “Integration into a
system,” writes Debord, “requires that isolated individuals be recaptured and isolated
together”? 2 The university building and classrooms are spaces which facilitate machinic
enslavement. Students, already isolated by spectacular separation (the reproduction of
geographical distance within themselves) are spaced out and isolated together in seating
arrangements in order to passively receive a given lecture. This “general movement of
isolation... must also include a controlled reintegration of [students] depending on the
needs of production and consumption that can be planned.”64 Thus, if “the technical
62 Noble, p. 26-27.
63 Debord, Society of the Spectacle, 172.
64 ibid.
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forces of capitalism must be understood as tools for the making of separations,”65 as
machinic enslavement which regiments individuals as separate cogs, “we are dealing with
the equipment at the basis o f these technical forces”66, in the case of spaces which cause
spectacular separation.
The forces of capitalist production that exist within university territory are evident
in corporatized buildings where there is a “transforming of scientific and engineering
knowledge into commercially viable proprietary products that could be owned and bought
and sold in the market.”67 This capitalization of knowledge (“the knowledge economy”)
is physically evident in university territory through the growth of massive computer labs
built throughout these corporate campus constructions. The labs are regimented sites of
“the rapid growth in the last few centuries o f... [capitalist] technical modes of skill.”68
Further regimentation becomes evident in the birth of online education where students are
fully separated from one another by these computers. Capitalist space has become
cyberspace. “Once faculty and courses go online,” claims David Noble,
“ .. .regimentation, discipline, and even censorship increase dramatically”69 due to the fact
that the administration will control the course content and eventually be able to reduce
professors to the same alienation level of the student (as we will see in the following
section). Debord’s contention has been that territory has been literally reconstructed for
the cause of the market, thus as the market develops from industrialism to a technological
post-industrialism, geography does so as well. Capitalist human circulation is becoming

65 ibid., 171.
66 ibid.
67 Noble, p. 27.
68 Dewey, p. 9.
69 Noble, p. 32.
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more effective through online traffic (ie. EBAY, Amazon, etc.) and the automation of
university education is following this path.
Therefore, the structuring of territory into capitalist space is a form o f discipline
ensuring that the face of capitalism exists within the very geography of the university in
order to shadow the reality of the socius:
universities tend to mirror the rest of society. Some have
become big businesses, employing thousands and collecting
millions in tuition fees... In some cities and towns, the
resident private university or college is the area’s largest
landlord, housing students and faculty and, in some
instances, collecting rents for ordinary or slum dwellings.
With these funds, the universities construct buildings, help
pay their CEOs (presidents) handsomely, and retain a small
army o f administrators and fundraisers.70
Like the rest of the urban landscape, universities are capitalist spaces. Students are
caught within these enclosures that serve as “protected place[s] of disciplinary
monotony,”71 we should add, a disciplinary capitalist monotony which is “the technical
organization of consumption... which has led the [university] to the point of consuming
itself.”72

Regimentation accomplished
To conclude this chapter, I want to focus on how the university is consuming itself
through its regimentation and control over the information and education that is becoming
more and more evident. Obviously there has been, in the past, a species of disciplines
distinct in the case of the student: rules of academic rigour, plagiarism guidelines, and

70 Aronowitz, p. 11.
71 Foucault, p. 141.
72 Debord, Society o f the Spectacle, 171.
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marking standards (for example, a certain number of students have to get an “A”, while
most have to get a “C”). More importantly, though, is the regimentation of course
information and regulations that even professors have to obey. The educators themselves
are being disciplined: “administrators have had to challenge and usurp the faculty’s legal
right to ownership of the copyright to their course materials—an endeavor which has
sparked the central battle over the future of academia.”73
In Digital Diploma Mills. David Noble investigates how the coming of the online
university is allowing this function of discipline to grow. Originally, Noble claims,
corporate control over education “centered upon the research function of the
universities.”74 The sciences were funded and commercialized because they were
beneficial to the overall functioning of the socius.
To make a long story short, universities... [were]
established as citadels of practical activity: science, of
course, which helped to produce the much admired atomic
bomb; engineering which dug tunnels under Gibraltar to
keep the Germans at bay; economics, which produced
Canada’s centralized tax system.75
Indeed, this funding of research upheld Dewey’s pragmatic view o f education by
attaching university information to social practicality. “It is not difficult,” writes Stanley
Aronowitz, “to discern the debt of this educational philosophy to John Dewey’s
pragmatism... [because] a good education tends to be construed within a framework of
instrumental rationality and formalism.”76 Therefore, the funding of research ensures the
control of information as an instrument of the apparatus of capture.

73 Noble, p. 37.
74 ibid.

75 Bercuson, Bothweil, and Granastein, p. 13.
76 Aronowitz, p. 136.
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With the coming of the online university, however, the capitalist control over
information has grown beyond research funding and has begun to determine educational
instruction itself. Just as the commercialization of research had transformed specific
information into an exchangeable commodity, the online automation of higher education
allows for “the instructional process, classroom teaching, [to be] converted into products,
such as CD-ROM’s, websites, or courseware.”77 In the previous section I discussed how
this shift produces a new geography, a capitalist cyberspace; and as a capitalist space it
allows for a corporate control o f information. Such a space is one where courses are
controlled as “marketable commodities by means of copyrights and licenses to distribute
copyrighted instructional processes.”78
Thus, copyright control becomes extremely important. The university
administration needs to usurp the ownership of the faculty “in order to capitalize on the
online instruction marketplace”79 and, in turn, work this faculty as “mere producers of
marketable instructional commodities that they may or may not themselves ‘deliver’.”80
The battle for copyright control, Noble notes, began in the mid-90s when numerous North
American institutions entered into business agreements with private firms (ie. Berkeley
and American Online) concerning educational commercialization81 which revealed that
such a control was important. In all of these agreements “the university has explicitly
assumed its own, rather than faculty, authorship/ownership of course materials.”82

77 Noble, p. 38.
78 ibid.
79 ibid., p. 39.
80 ibid., p. 38.
81 ibid., p. 39.
82 ibid.
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The corporate control over intellectual property allows the university apparatus to
stamp the face of capitalism onto all of its courseware. By assuming
authorship/ownership the administration can make whatever deal it wishes, with
whomever it wishes, and thus profit on lucrative deals. The faculty, ousted from their
traditional role, have become subject to a faciality machine: they are told to either become
part of this corporate informational process or lose their jobs. Although the faculty can
resist, the choice of resistance is never presented to them by the administration. Since the
professoriate is already defined by the administration, they can either continue
representing the administrative interests in the new regime or risk dismissal. A cog in the
apparatus can always be replaced.
This regimentation of information, then, permits a systematic control over the
university institution. The control of faculty courseware allows the administration to
control its teachers and, therefore, its students. Returning to Foucault’s idea of discipline
being a composition o f forces, the university reveals itself as “a machine whose effect
will be maximized by the concerted articulation of the elementary parts of which it is
composed.”83 The control of intellectual property is a regime of signs: information has a
specific commodity function, faculty must teach it as such, and students will learn it as
such. In other words, once curricula are controlled by the administration, such curricula
will be tailored to fit the administration’s goal of an economically lucrative institution. In
order to fit in with this administrative dream, educators are now forced to “confront the
harsh realities o f capitalist production: speedup, routinization of work, greater work
discipline and managerial supervision, reduced autonomy, job insecurity, employer
appropriation of the fruits of their labor, and, above all, the insistent managerial pressures
to reduce labor costs in order to turn a profit.”84
83 Foucault, p. 164.
84 Noble, p. 4.
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Machinic enslavement is evident in the push for online education because, as
aforementioned, as soon as “faculty and courses go online, administrators gain much
greater direct control over faculty performance and course content than ever before”85,
and all forms of discipline will “increase dramatically.”86 Furthermore, the university
will come to resemble, even more, the world of alienated labour as work hours, for both
student and faculty, become scheduled and disciplined to a greater degree. The faculty’s
academic knowledge, transformed into an instrumental commodity, becomes part of the
apparatus’ machinery and allows for the faculty itself to sink to a commodity level: “[t]he
administration is now in a position to hire less skilled, and hence cheaper, workers to
deliver the technologically pre-packaged course.”87
Although Noble notes that this online restructuring of university territory is not in
full bloom, due to student and faculty protest, he holds that it is growing at a rapid pace.
Already, the university administration has begun to control educational information, and
it is only a matter o f time before it requires “faculty to assign all copyrights on course
material to the university as a condition of employment”.88 When the information is thus
controlled, the entire educational process will become completely regimented.

Conclusion
A disciplinary institution which promulgates a regime o f signs, structures and
controls its territory, and regiments the educational information is ultimately a machine,
or an apparatus o f capture. The regimentation that is affected by capitalism is machinic
enslavement because the entire institution subjects itself to the machine of capitalism,
85 ibid., p. 32.
86 ibid.
87 ibid.
88 ibid., p. 40.
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producing “an unrivaled slavery, an unprecedented subjugation: there are no longer even
any masters, but only slaves commanding others slaves... for the social machine.”89
Even the bounded freedom of academia, which allows for the production of social
criticism, is slowly being eroded. The birth of a new capitalist space, an online space,
does not allow for criticism because it only allows for instrumental education.
With capitalist regimentation pervading every aspect of the university system one
can almost claim that schools do not merely, as Foucault wrote, resemble prisons. “There
is no metaphor here... they do not resemble prisons, they are prisons.”90 Such prisons,
although systems o f regimentation, are merely reified arrangements of social relations
which, as such, may be ultimately changed.

89 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 254.
90 ibid., p. 374.
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CHAPTER THREE
the educational model
“The system needs its servants, each birth is one more
They’ll gently talk o f freedom as they quietly lock the door
‘Cos the system needs its servants if the system’s gonna run
Needs its fodder for the workhouse, its targets for the gun.”
Crass, “Reality Whitewash ”

Introduction
In the preceding chapter the capitalist modes of regimentation were investigated in
order to demonstrate how students are controlled and ultimately integrated into the socius.
There is a problem, however, in conceiving of the university institution as a vast machinic
prison. As aforementioned, the university setting is also a place where a measure of
freedom is allowed. It is a place in which critical texts are produced and, oft-times,
critical thinking is encouraged. If the university were simply a functional machine, as the
previous chapter suggests, then even this freedom that demonstrably exists would be
inexplicable. This tension in the argument will need to be resolved.
As was discussed at the outset of this paper, the university is a contradictory
institution which allows a measure of critical freedom as long as this freedom stays
bounded inside the gates o f academia. It is this contradiction which makes the control
and regimentation, discussed in the last chapter, make sense. The aim of this
regimentation is economic and social integration, and a certain amount of freedom is
permitted as long as it does not interfere with this final goal. In this regard, such a
freedom mirrors liberal society in general, reflecting M ill’s ideas about freedom in On
Liberty. As Mill writes, “[a]n opinion that com dealers are starvers of the poor, or that
private property is robbery, ought to be unmolested when simply circulated through the
press, but may justly incur punishment when delivered orally to an excited mob
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assembled before the house of a com dealer”.1 In other words, a measure of freedom is
permitted as long as it remains in the abstract, but as soon as it interferes with the status
quo—where an angry mob is incited to rebel—then such freedom becomes impermissible.
Yet there are often individuals who are able to escape the complete effects of the
university apparatus’ control of the status quo. They may become social critics or
conscientious protesters. These individuals, however, still have to deal with “one vast
machine, extending over the planet an enslavement of all mankind.”2 Although such a
machine may ultimately be overcome, at present the delirium it constructs spreads across
the entire globe. This delirium is supported, in part, by an academic institution that
impedes critical freedom from passing beyond university gates.
That the above contradiction exists is due to the educational model of knowledge
that the university promotes, a model evident, as we have seen, in the pragmatic
philosophy of Dewey. In this chapter, then, this model of knowledge will be examined.
We will focus on Deleuze and Guattari’s idea of “knowledge capital”, Freire’s “banking
model” of education, and the book Petrified Campus’ development of Laidler’s idea of
human capital. Finally, I will investigate the educational model in light of Herman and
Chomsky’s “propaganda model”.

Knowledge capital
In the previous chapter, the capitalist system of representation was examined and
understood as a “technical means of expression”3 where information is “adapted to
money as the general equivalent”.4 Or, as Dyer-Witheford writes in Cyber-Marx,
1 Mill, p. 1206.
2 Guattari and Negri, p. 7.
3 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 240.
4 ibid.
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“information... has become an indispensable ingredient in a massive reorganization of
advanced capitalist societies [which are now] centred on the introduction of new
technologies.”5 The capitalist sign, then, is that of capital and all other forms of
representation must fall under this order. Therefore, the study and pursuit of any kind of
knowledge should be understood as knowledge capital. This section will investigate
Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of knowledge capital and its roots in the liberal educational
philosophy o f John Dewey.
According to Deleuze and Guattari nothing has value, in a capitalist society,
unless it is considered in terms of its overall “profitability... in its relationships with the
market and with commercial and financial capital.”6 In a capitalist society, the
production of textiles, for example, is not judged valuable because it is a need or is
attractive, but on the profitability of the textile commodity: how many units can be sold
and exchanged on the world market, and how much profit can be generated. Likewise,
the production of knowledge is a commodity which bears some similarity to something as
mundane as textiles. In terms of scientific knowledge, for instance, “the introduction of
innovations always tends to be delayed beyond the time scientifically necessary, until the
moment when the market forecasts justify their exploitation on a large scale.”7 Although
pure research may be permitted, it is always justified and funded in terms of technical and
economic payoffs in the future. Alternate versions of the gas-driven car, for example,
have been envisioned and invented—a sugar car, an electric car—but have been ultimately
shelved because the market is not finished with oil.
Scientific knowledge, however, is just one aspect of these capitalised codes of
information. “Knowledge, information, and... education,” write Deleuze and Guattari,
5 Dyer-Witheford, p. 37.
6Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 234.
7 ibid.
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“are just as much parts o f capital (‘knowledge capital’) as is the most elementary labor of
the worker.”8 Although knowledge, information and education possess a history which
precedes the capitalist socius, they can be commodified along with everything else:
The tendency o f capitalism is to substitute for fixed and
limiting relations between men and things an abstract unit
o f equivalence that allows the free exchange, and aleatory
substitution, o f everything for everything. Not only are
equivalences established between goods in an open market,
but bodies, actions, ideas, knowledge, fantasies, images
function as commodities which can be translated into other
commodities.9
Everything is ultimately exploitable by the delirium of capitalism.
I am not suggesting, however, that the knowledge learned in an educational setting
is simply capitalistic. One may learn many things which are either anti-capitalist (forms
of critical theory and modes of thought which enable one to break free of socially
sanctioned thought forms) or pre-capitalist. In the former case, however, I refer back to
the first chapter where, in the section concerning Debord, I discussed the capitalist
appropriation o f revolutionary theory. By transforming revolutionary theories into
separated schools of thought, social criticism becomes stratified—he’s a Marxist Idealist
while she’s a Marxist Realist. And the latter case (studies of a pre-capitalist nature) is
viewed as an educational archaism which can still be attached to the capitalist order:
the [pre-capitalist] flows of code... are subjected to a
properly social axiomatic that is much severer... than all the
old codes and overcodes that have disappeared: the
axiomatic of the world capitalist market. In brief, the flows
of code that are ‘liberated’ [from previous social orders] by
the capitalist regime engender a machinic surplus value that

8 ibid.
9 Bogue, p. 100.
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does not directly depend on [knowledge itself], but on
capital.10
In other words, although the university system may teach social criticism and an historical
tradition, as a capitalist apparatus of capture the ultimate end of this knowledge is profit.
Even though studying Greek philosophy or Middle English may not be “profititable” in
and of themselves, they can be taught as anticipating capital-as outdated studies that are
worthy to be learned for traditional reasons, and that are now irrelevant due to the new
social order. And these faculties become underfunded since they are not as profitable as,
for example, economics. Such a profitability is evident in the birth of the online
universities as discussed by Noble and examined in the previous chapter. The university
space has become a factory that produces commodified knowledge, where “the buying
and selling o f commodities takes on the appearance of education”.11 Furthermore, online
universities are only focused on programs that possess “immediate benefit to the
corporate sector.”12 Thus, they specialize in programs such as computer science,
economics, or business.
Just as the university is a contradictory institution, composed by the forces of free
thought and social integration, so too is the concept of “knowledge capital”. Knowledge
implies freedom o f thought, the quest of philosophers, the sun in Plato’s cave allegory
and, for the ancients, the pursuit of truth. Capital, on the other hand, implies the pursuit
of profit, the love o f money and wealth which, for philosophers like Plato and Aristotle13
, was pathological (see Republic Bk. 1 and the discussion with Thrasymachus14) and may

10 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 234.
11 Noble, p. 4.
12 Dyer-Witheford, p. 110.
13 although not for the Hedonists.
14 Plato 343b-344c
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interfere with the quest for knowledge. True knowledge for Plato, for example, is not
connected with crude pleasures such as wealth but with a transcendent “good” which is
“the source not only o f the intelligibility of the objects of knowledge, but also of their
being and reality.”15 The concept of knowledge capital, then, may produce information
which many ancient philosophers would never approve of—a “stupidity in the midst of
knowledge and science”16 which allows “apolitico-military-economic complex... [to
engender] for its own part an enormous machinic surplus value by mobilizing the
resources of knowledge and information capital.”17 Therefore, what one learns at
university may also be appropriated by the capitalist machine to serve the cause of the
socius: business skills, scientific weaponry, and apologetics for the state.
Since in the midst of the university’s critical world of academics knowledge
capital spawns a “stupidity”, it is easy to ignore and overlook the critical freedom this
institution also possesses. This “stupidity” is evident in student actions which have long
become pop-cultural stereotypes: keg parties, fraternity shenanigans, amusing clubs,
fashion cliques, and all of the distracting social escapades which have formed the subjects
for many movies and sitcoms that claim that this is what university is about. And this
“stupidity” becomes further evident when its practitioners cut their classes—because they
stayed up late partying—and end up “cramming” to achieve a passing grade. Such a
“stupidity”, created by the alienation of the student, allows for the propagation of
knowledge capital.
Capitalism, according to Deleuze and Guattari, following Marx, is defined by the
contradictory forces o f production and anti-production. In other words, the capitalist
socius, which tends to overproduce, needs to destroy its forces of production and products
15 ibid., 509b
16 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 236.
17 ibid., p. 235.
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in order to keep on producing: “the capitalist effusion is that of antiproduction within
production at all levels o f the process... to produce lack... where there is always too
much”18 (thus producing demand for supply). The “stupidity” found in the midst of
knowledge mimics this goal of capitalism. The force of antiproduction is realized as “an
equivalent flow o f stupidity that also effects an absorption and a realization, and that
ensures the integration of groups and individuals into the system.”19 Thus we now have
four contradictions which mirror and imitate one another: production and antiproduction,
knowledge and stupidity, knowledge and capital, and critical freedom and social
integration. The last o f these contradictions is what defines the university and perhaps
this contradiction only exists because capitalism itse lf is contradictory.
Therefore it would be a mistake to construe John Dewey’s educational
philosophy, and all of its analogues, as the force which constructed the academic
contradiction o f critical freedom and social integration. Dewey merely described and
helped implement the contradiction contained in the notion of knowledge capital. The
institution of the university, previous to Dewey’s philosophy, had imitated the despotic
order. It was an ivory tower which courted the societal elite. Out of a liberal humanism,
Dewey believed that education needed to satisfy the needs of the modem “man” and not
the “citizen” of an archaic order20, and therefore must imitate “the industrial revolution,
and the development of democracy.”21
The focus on the man of modernity rather than the archaic citizen is a product of
what Deleuze and Guattari call deterritorialization, where the market appears to override
the State and the modem man appears to replace the citizen. But the market becomes the
18 ibid., p. 235.
19 ibid., p. 235-236.
20 Dewey, p. 93.
21 ibid., p. 331.
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new State-the detenitorialized Capitalist State—and the modem man becomes the new
citizen, the citizen o f global capitalism. Since Dewey was writing during the days of
early industrialism, when capitalism was becoming the dominant reality, his apparent
humanitarian construct of “man” is simply the capitalist citizen.
Finally, Dewey’s desire for education to develop along with “the rapid growth in
the last few centuries of knowledge and technical modes of skill”22 is the starting point
for an educational model of knowledge capital. The student, for Dewey, is to be nurtured
and fostered in order to be socially profitable. The goal of his liberal model is “social
efficiency... [and] industrial competency”.23 The concept of knowledge capital, after all,
implies that knowledge is attached to the interests of the economy, and Dewey’s
philosophy does not deny this association. He says explicitly that the “result ability [of
education is] to make one’s way economically in the world and to manage economic
resources usefully” 24
The shape of knowledge capital, described and implemented by Dewey’s
philosophical influence, is the educational model which mimics the modem socius (a
social order defined by the market). But the market, the dominant feature of the socius, is
merely a human invention that has been, according to Lukacs, reified and thus given a
phantom objectivity. The liberal model of education, then, may also possess such a
phantom objectivity. Once we recognize its nature as an arrangement of social relations
we may be able to change its face.

22 ibid., p. 9.
23 ibid., p.119.
24 ibid.
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Banking education
The educational model of knowledge capital propagates itself through the
mediation of a faculty whose task is to “nurture” and “foster” the student. As
aforementioned, university professors—although sinking, themselves, to the level of a
commodity—participate in the alienation of the student by allowing the capitalist
academic discourse to proceed from their podiums. This is not to say that professors are
simply instruments o f the apparatus of capture (because there are numerous radical
educators). Rather, teachers are part of the fostering of knowledge capital. Although
professors face alienation themselves (ie. the coming of the online university), they are
the bottom managment25 o f the educational factory; they are oppressed by the factory’s
rules, but they manage the oppression of the labourers below them, the students. Paulo
Freire refers to this fostering of knowledge capital as the banking concept of education,
and this section will outline this concept as preparation for the positive appropriation of
Freire’s critical pedagogy in the next chapter.
“Education thus becomes an act of depositing,” writes Freire, “in which the
students are the depositories and the teacher is the depositor... This is the ‘banking’
concept of education, in which the scope of action allowed to the students extends only as
far as receiving, filing, and storing the deposits.”26 We have observed that Dewey’s
philosophy reveals this educational attitude insofar as he conceives of the teaching
process as “a fostering, a nurturing, a cultivating process.”27 As Freire rightly points out,
this oft-times patronizing approach leads to an alienation between the student and her

25 A manager I once had at one of my student jobs was a perfect example of bottom
management. In many ways he was like the workers he managed-overworked, frustrated,
subject to the authority of upper management-but, when push came to shove, he would still show
us who was boss.
26 Freire, p. 53.
27 Dewey, p. 10.
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education since her education has been reduced to deposits which just need to be stored—
she only needs to memorize certain facts in order to pass her course. For, “in the last
analysis, it is the people themselves who are filed away through the lack of creativity,
transformation, and knowledge in this (at best) misguided system.”28
Therefore, the banking concept creates another educational contradiction—a
“teacher-student contradiction”29—which “negates education and knowledge as process of
inquiry.”30 According to Freire, real education should be a holistic process in which both
the teacher and the student are engaged in a continuous process of inquiry. The banking
method of education, however, sets up the learning process as an oppressive pedagogy
and opposes the teacher to the student:
Projecting an absolute ignorance onto others, a
characteristic of the ideology of oppression... [t]he teacher
presents himself to his students as the necessary opposite;
by considering their ignorance absolute, he justifies his own
existence.31
The teacher-student contradiction, maintained by the banking concept of
education, is evident in a number of attitudes:
a) the teacher teaches and the students are taught;
b) the teacher knows everything and the students know
nothing;
c) the teacher thinks and the students are thought about;
d) the teacher talks and the students listen—meekly.32

28 Freire, p. 53.

29 ibid.
30 ibid.
31 ibid.
32 ibid., p. 54.
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The paradigmatic university classroom is characterized by a professor lecturing from
behind a podium to ranked and filed students busily copying down the words which issue
from his mouth. This is not to say that students are not allowed to question the lecture,
but the questioning takes place on the professor’s own terms: hands should be raised, or a
designated question and answer period is allowed at the end of the class. But the
contradiction goes further...
e) the teacher disciplines and the students are disciplined;
f) the teacher chooses and enforces his choice, and the
students comply;
g) the teacher acts and the students have the illusion of
acting through the action o f the teacher;
h) the teacher chooses the program content, and the students
(who were not consulted) adapt to it.33
The university, as discussed in the previous chapter, is a disciplinary institution, and the
professor, to some extent at least, is an instrument o f this discipline. The examination,
for example, is a form of discipline which is chosen by the professor to reflect his chosen
program content and “makes it possible to qualify, to classify and to punish.”34 The final
result is that
i) the teacher confuses the authority of knowledge with his
or her own professional authority, which she and he sets
in opposition to the freedom of the students;
j) the teacher is the Subject of the learning process, while
the pupils are mere objects.35
Students have been alienated and reduced to receptacles that are processed through the
university institution, classroom by classroom, until they are ready to leave. Their grade

33 ibid.
34 Foucault, p. 184.
35 Freire, p. 54.
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point average is the end result of their professors’ authoritative teaching and marking.
This is not to say that there are no such thing as bad students, but the “stupidity” of
students (discussed in the previous section) is partly due to the contradiction inherent to
knowledge capital. The teacher-student contradiction fosters this “stupidity” by opposing
the professor to the student so that many students do not wish to truly learn, but only do
enough to pass the course. If this contradiction were resolved the “bad students” may
slowly disappear from classrooms.
The aforementioned attitudes intrinsic to the banking model of education regard
“men as adaptable, manageable beings.”36 The manageable student may be integrated
into the socius by the university apparatus of capture and, having been managed and
fostered, will be able “to make one’s way economically in the world and ... manage
economic resources usefully”.37 Banking education, which propagates the teacherstudent contradiction, also propagates the contradiction with which this paper is mainly
concerned: the contradiction between critical freedom and social integration. The student
may be taught critical skills and allowed a measure of freedom, but the banking method
renders her manageable and controllable:
The more students work at storing the deposits entrusted to
them, the less they develop the critical consciousness which
would result from their intervention in the world as
transformers of that world. The more completely they
accept the passive role imposed on them, the more they tend
simply to adapt to the world as it is and to the fragmented
view of reality deposited on them.38
This “fragmented view of reality” is the face of the socius which is stamped onto the
university apparatus of capture: the capitalist delirium.
36 ibid.
37 Dewey, p. 119.
38 Freire, p. 54.
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The contradiction between critical freedom and social integration becomes more
evident when one understands that the interests of banking education lie in ‘“ changing the
consciousness o f the oppressed, not the situation which oppresses them’; for the more the
oppressed can be led to adapt to that situation, the more easily they can be dominated.”39
Students may be taught to critically engage with a text, or even critically examine social
structures, but such skills are bound to the world of the university: the critical analysis of
society becomes, at the end of the day, just another text to be deposited in the
consciousness o f the student. The student’s consciousness, after all, is to be nurtured and
fostered in the direction of social efficiency. The transformation of the world outside of
the university gates is not in the interests of this efficiency. Dewey’s liberal
“humanitarian” philosophy of education, then, is not interested in having “the world
revealed nor to see it transformed”40; it is interested in “presenting] a profitable
situation.”41
Moreover, the banking concept veils the interdependence of humanity by
assuming a dichotomy between the teacher and student, and “a dichotomy between
human beings and the world: a person is merely in the world, not with the world or with
others; the individual is spectator not recreator.”42 The veiling of humanity’s essential
interdependence has always been propagated by capitalism, and the banking method of
teaching echoes this task. The solution, then, is to conceive of education as a mutual
process between teacher and student, and “not to ‘integrate’ them into the structure of

39 ibid., p. 55.
40 ibid., p. 54.
41 ibid.
42 ibid., p. 56.
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oppression [which creates the teacher-student contradiction], but to transform that
structure”.43 I will propose a strategy for such a transition in the final chapter.

The liberal model revisited
Before moving on to a discussion of a critical pedagogy, I want to examine an
example of current liberal approaches to education which hide the problems analyzed by
Freire. “The concept of human capital,” writes Laidler, one of these new liberal
education reformers, “has been central to the economic analysis of education for about 40
years.”44 Just as Dewey perceived of education as something which served the modem
economy, current liberal educators define university education as a knowledge economy
with the student as the smallest unit. The student as human capital is a concept which,
through the doctrine o f postindustrialism, incorporates both the concepts of knowledge
capital and banking education. The student unit is a commodity that has been invested in
by the factory which produced it (the university) and may, in turn, capitalize on its
knowledge by taking its education “to market and offering] it for sale as a commodity”.45
Three o f the contributors to the Laidler study—David Bercuson, Robert Bothwell,
and J.L. Granatstein—have written a book called Petrified Campus: the Crisis of Canada’s
Universities, that discusses and defends this modem liberal view on education. What is
interesting about this book is that it seems to directly invoke the old liberal model of
education and thus reveals the educational contradiction with which this paper is
concerned. This section of the chapter will investigate the philosophy of this book and
the educational model that guides the modem university.

43 ibid., p. 55.
44 Laidler, p. 8.
45 ibid.
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Bercuson and his fellow authors cast themselves as modem Deweys who are
continuing the liberal reform of the old ivory tower. Indeed, their goals seem
enlightened:
If universities are to teach students how to think, how to use
their brains, rather than to cram facts into them, then
universities must also be places of free inquiry. Free
inquiry is the simple freedom of professors and students to
seek after knowledge, truth, beauty, even ugliness, wherever
they believe they may find it.46
So far, so good. Such an aim seems idealistic and, phrased as such, should be defended.
Everyone should support “free inquiry”, after all, is this not what this very paper is about?
But Bercuson and his fellow authors go on to write that “[tjhere are always limits on any
freedom,”47 and their book is designed to show just what these limits are and, further,
what the aim o f this freedom should be in actuality.
Although the authors begin by defending free inquiry, they limit this freedom by
claiming that “[sjtudents [have] too much say in determining strictly academic matters”.48
In other words, the democratization of education is primarily a good thing, but “[t]oo
much democracy [has] crept into the university governance.”49 What the authors are
referring to as too much democracy are policies like student unions and entrance equity,
and they believe that universities have “become instruments of public policy rather than
institutions of learning.”50 While I agree that universities have become instruments of
public policy; it is not a democratic policy, but a capitalist policy of integration that

46 Bercuson, et al., p. 2.
47 ibid.
48 ibid., p. 5.
49 ibid.
50 ibid..
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determines them. This capitalist policy is not reflected in the bounded academic freedom
the authors are complaining about (I believe that this freedom is a good thing and should
extend beyond the university); but it is reflected in their very philosophy.
Bercuson and his fellow authors reveal their educational ideology when they hold
up American and British universities as the model that Canadian universities must strive
to imitate. “The university has always been the training ground [for industry],”51 the
authors claim, but it started to fall short of the American and British standard when
Canadian university accessibility was made easier.52 The issue of accessibility, though, is
not something I want to engage with at this point. Rather, I want to point out the authors’
driving argument: the university is a training ground for economic integration, and
freedoms such as “accessibility” interfere with this goal because students are admitted
who do not care if there is a “job at the end of university”.53 Moreover, students who are
unqualified, according to the authors, are admitted, thus denying the market the benefit of
“the brightest in society”.54 The philosophy of banking education should be evident at
this point; university, for the authors, is a place where the captured students are invested
in, and therefore must be among those who can return this investment in the job market.55

51 ibid., p. 45.
52 ibid., p. 49.
53 ibid., p. 48.
54 ibid.
55 As a side note, the authors lament that “qualified white males” (Bercuson, p. 48) are denied access in
the interests o f minority groups which may have “important qualifications stemming from [a] different
perspective.” (ibid.) Bercuson and his fellow writers claim that this kind o f admission logic is unfair to the
poor white male who is better qualified to take his place in society. The philosophy o f economic integration
is evident in this regard as well since the face o f the market is that “o f modem White Man, the semiotic of
capitalism”. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1000 Plateaus, p. 182)
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Furthermore, the authors refer to the university in terms of a factory, taking it for
granted that this is an accepted fact: “Canada’s universities—indeed, those of much of the
world—face... major challenges today: how to reach more ‘customers’; how to ensure that
universities continue to ‘add value’ to their product”.56 Bercuson and his friends go on
to claim that the universities are falling short of this goal since they are not fully
embracing the new economic reality (as Dewey had claimed as well) which is “a growing
demand for off-campus education, a demand that cannot be ignored.”57 In other words,
the authors are supporters of the online university which has been criticized by David
Noble and discussed, at length, in the last chapter. Online universities, for Bercuson and
the others, are the solution to the above problem—the way in which the university can
“continue to ‘add value’ to their product”, and the universities must “learn to adapt to
new times.”58 (Sounding familiar?) The knowledge economy must, according to the
doctrine of the “information revolution”, develop alongside the market economy.
While appearing to claim that universities are behind the times, all the Bercuson
crew is doing is describing the university’s current function. Their guiding philosophy
admits that the university is a knowledge economy and that the student is human capital—
a “product”. Even when they claim that many students “drift along, boring themselves”59
all they are doing is unwittingly describing the “stupidity” in the midst of knowledge
which is the central contradiction of knowledge capital. Therefore, what they see as
primarily flawed about the university—students who do not provide a return on
investment—is actually part of the model they support: capitalism’s contradictory forces
of production and anti-production. Moreover, what the authors demand—adaptation to a
56 Bercuson, et al., p. 84.
57 ibid., p. 88.
58 ibid., p. 89.
59 ibid., p. 48.
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changing market—is already the direction in which the university is moving; Noble’s book
discusses this fact in great detail. Noble’s position, as aforementioned, is that the
university system is already adapting to the realities of the capitalist market; online
education being the prime example of how university courses have become “marketable
instructional commodities”.60 The liberal model of education is still alive and
functioning, even if it is not adapting as fast as Bercuson and the other authors of
Petrified Campus would like. And it is inaccurate to describe it as a “liberal model”; it is
a capitalist model disguised as humanitarian.
I am not claiming that Bercuson and his fellow writers are intentionally disguising
their concerns with human capital behind humanitarian considerations; like Dewey before
them, they sincerely believe they are possessed by humanitarian concerns. In the interests
of “free inquiry” they still support a critical academic freedom: “[universities must
remain among the very few places on earth where the unconventional, the uncomfortable,
the once unmentionable can be pursued in both teaching and research.”61 Indeed, the
authors defend the freedom of knowledge; they do so, however, with the philosophy that
the university is “an open and free marketplace”62 and this is the problem with their
viewpoint. That “freedom” can only exist within a bounded institution that promotes
economic integration is absurd. Such a view of freedom is limiting and socially bankrupt;
it is the freedom o f a dusty library shelf and not society. Freedom should not be
relegated to “very few places on earth” but should flow over all places on earth. Thus
Bercuson and the others are merely describing and recasting the contradiction with which
this paper is concerned: critical freedom versus social integration. Despite the authors’
humanitarian concerns, it is ultimately the market that matters, and the university is cast
60 Noble, p. 38.
61Bercuson, et al., p. 204.
62 ibid.
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as an institution that must, first and foremost, mirror the economic reality of society—the
social delirium. The Bercuson crew, then, are merely wolves in sheeps’ clothing without
even realizing it.

Propaganda Model
In this chapter a number ofbasic claims have been made concerning the current
model of education. Broadly speaking, university education was described as
“knowledge capital” in which the free pursuit of knowledge is bounded by the interests of
capital. This binding conflicts the liberal definition of education as a free pursuit of
interest. Education, then, functions directly upon the student as “banking education”. An
authoritarian structure is established that veils the mutual relation of the educator and the
educated by forcing knowledge to flow through a “teacher-student contradiction”.
Moreover, this contradictory approach to education, which opposes critical freedom to
social integration, is evident in the philosophy of Dewey’s intellectual heirs who claim to
be university reformers. The fact that this educational contradiction continues to exist is
because the capitalist model of education is a kind o f “propaganda model”.
In this section of this chapter I will compare the university system of education to
Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky’s “propaganda model” of the media. Obviously
this comparison is only meant to be an analogy that will hopefully illuminate the issues
discussed in this chapter. As with all analogies there are numerous limitations: Herman
and Chomsky’s research, for instance, is directed at the mass media and so their empirical
research does not inform my specific approach. Furthermore, not all models are fully
translatable. Thus, it would be false to assume that everything they say about the media
holds true for education as well. But it is not my intention to build an entire paper out of
this propaganda model; it is only meant as a useful analogy that will elucidate the
concepts contained in this chapter. Therefore, just as I compared the university student to
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Marx’s alienated nineteenth century factory worker, I will compare the university model
of education with a media model of propaganda.
The basis o f this comparison between the university and the media is:
The mass media serve as a system for communicating
messages and symbols to the general populace. It is their
function to amuse, entertain, and inform, and to inculcate
individuals with the values, beliefs, and codes of behaviour
that will integrate them into the institutional structures of
the larger society.63
We can see clearly how this model makes sense in the context of the arguments
developed in this and the first two chapters. As was discussed in the first chapter, in
regards to Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the “apparatus of capture”, the “supreme
task” of any State institution is to integrate individuals into “a global system of desire and
destiny that organizes the productions of production... and the productions of
consumption.”64 This concept was expanded in the second chapter which was devoted to
the university regimentation of the student—the “chum[ing] out [of] the trained personnel
that is so essential for bureaucratic capitalism.”65 One of the ways in which this
disciplined training is accomplished is through a regime o f signs66—a capitalist order of
representation which, like mass media, “inculcate[s] individuals with the values, beliefs
and codes o f behaviour that will integrate them into the institutional structures of the
larger society.”
Furthermore, the mass media is a spectacle, and thus another aspect of Debord’s
“spectacular society” o f which the university’s placement has already been discussed.

63 Herman and Chomsky, p. 1.
64 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 142.
65 Cohn-Bendit, p. 41.
66 Deleuze and Guattari,

1000 Plateaus, p. 111.
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The media, for Debord, is one disseminator of “image-obj ects” which affects social
separation67, but “[e] verything that was directly lived has moved away into
representation’’68—the university along with the media. As was already investigated in
this chapter’s section on knowledge capital, there is a “stupidity” evident amongst
students which has become a pop-cultural representation in movies and sitcoms.
Spectacular society is the whole of society because institutions such as the media and the
university present life as an “immense accumulation of spectacles”^ in which the
dominant capitalist ideology has “transformed, and polluted, [the world] according to the
means and interests of modem industry.”70
Using Herman and Chomsky’s propaganda model as an analogy, then, we should
be able trace “the routes by which money and power are able to filter out... [and]
marginalize dissent,”71 allowing the model of education to remain in line with the
interests of a capitalistic state. This model possesses five “filters” which describe how it
functions: the size, advertising, experts, flak, and anticommunism.72 Since Manufacturing
Consent was written during the end of the coldwar the last filter was specifically referring
to anti-Soviet sentiment evident in the media; thus I am choosing to interpret it, instead,
as procapitalism.

67 see Chapter One, and the section concerning Spectacular Society.
68 Debord, Society o f the Spectacle, 1, emphasis added.
69 ibid.
70 Debord, Comments on the Society o f the Spectacle, p. 10.
71 Herman and Chomsky, p. 2.
72 ibid.
73 One could also, now, substitute anti-Islam for anticommunism.
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The first filter, the size, refers to the “concentrated ownership, owner wealth, and
profit orientation of the dominant mass-media firms”.74 The authors are referring to the
idea of media moguls who own sizable portions of the media industry. Such moguls are
individuals like Israel Asper who controls a large percentage of Canadian media (Global
Canwest, The Star, The National Post) and, therefore, holds a lot of power over
information—power, for example, to fire columnists who do not fall in line with his own
political agenda. University size and ownership are obviously different; there are no
nameable educational mogols. But although the Asper o f the university world might not
exist, as universities grow in size they fall increasingly into the realm of corporate
ownership, as authors like Stanley Aronowitz and David Noble attest to—a realm where
Berkeley, for example, can enter into a partnership with American Online.75 Thus, even
though a single controlling figure may not be evident, there is still “concentrated
ownership” since “the university has explicitly assumed its own, rather than faculty,
authorship/ownership of course materials.”76
Advertising is, according to Herman and Chomsky, “the primary income source of
the mass media”77, and therefore the media must reflect the interests of its advertisers if it
desires to keep its funding. One of the issues discussed in the last chapter of this paper
was the commercialization of education; Noble claims that the birth of the online
university is due, in part, to commercial interests: a new territory—a cyberspace—can be
constructed in which electronic advertising will be ever present (pop-ups, banners, etc.).
Before the beginning of the online university, however, advertising played a role in the
educational process. University territory has already been funded by corporations,
74 Herman and Chomsky, p. 2.
75 Noble, p. 39.
76 ibid.
77 Herman and Chomsky, p. 2.
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transforming the campus into a capitalist space where advertising is ever present—from
the university buildings, to the calendars, to the urinals in the bathrooms. Although this
widespread advertising may seem as nothing more than an annoying optical toxin, the
reality is that it does influence aspects of the educational process. In the sciences, for
example, there is corporate funding “for all types of scientific research [in order to
produce] commercially oriented molecular biology applications, chiefly for agricultural
and drug corporations.”78 Moreover the university has also been involved in military
research, as Bercuson and his fellow authors admit: “[university] science helped to
produce the much admired atomic bomb; engineering [helped engineer the] tunnels under
Gibraltar to keep the Germans at bay”.79 Obviously the funding of this kind of research
is a form of advertising insofar as the research advertises for the company that funded it;
studies that are taught in science take on the partial identity of an advertisement.
The third filter of the propaganda model is “the reliance of the media on
information provided by government, business, and 'experts' funded and approved by
these primary sources and agents of power.”80 For Herman and Chomsky this filter is
meant to analyze the flow o f news information from the Pentagon and “the corporate
sector”81 to the sites o f media production where information is homogenized and,
furthermore, nominate and control the “expert” voices. With this filter there is a direct
intersection with the university; the mass media partially recruits its “needed body of
experts” from academia:
The process of creating the needed body of experts has
been carried out on a deliberate basis and a massive scale.
Back in 1972, Judge Lewis Powell (later elevated to the
78 Aronowitz, p. 173.
79 Bercuson, et

al., p. 13.

80 Herman and Chomsky, p. 2, emphasis added.
81 ibid., p. 21.
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Supreme Court) wrote a memo to the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce urging business ‘to buy the top academic
reputations in the country to add credibility to corporate
studies and give business a stronger voice on the
campuses.’82
Therefore, not only are these academic recruits the “experts” of the media, but already
represent corporate interests in the educational arena.
Flak, the fourth filter of the propaganda model, is defined as “a means of
disciplining the media”.83 In the university apparatus professors are also given flak and
disciplined in a variety of ways if they contradict the interests of the socius. As was
aforementioned (in the last chapter’s discussion on faciality) numerous professors have
been punished and ridiculed, post-September 11th, because they made critical comments
about American foreign policy.84 The message is clear: if what is being taught
contradicts the status quo then the teachers must be punished or marginalized.
The final filter of the propaganda model is one of procapitalism as a “control
mechanism”.85 In terms o f education, this filter’s meaning is clear. It is one of the
fundamental assertions o f this paper. From the outset of this project we have investigated
the university as a capitalist “apparatus of capture”, and the educational model has been
described as “knowledge-capital”.
According to Herman and Chomsky, all five filters o f the propaganda model
interact with and reinforce one another. The raw material
o f news must pass through successful filters, leaving only
the cleansed residue fit to print. They fix the premises of

82 ibid., p. 23.
83 ibid., p. 2.
84 Noble, p. 94.
85 Herman and Chomsky, p. 2.
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discourse and interpretation, and the definition of what is
newsworthy.86
In his essay The Unspeakable: Understanding the System o f Fallacy in the Media, John
McMurtry points out that such fixed premises render numerous facts “unspeakable”—
effectively filtered out of the public discourse “because they in one way or other
contradict justification of the structure of social rule by which they are surrounded.”87
One such “unspeakable” fact, for example, would be that universities “do not train the
young to think critically, but to obey corporate or office authority without question.”88
The university’s educational model, then, also attempts to filter out information which is
considered unspeakable and thus not “fit to learn”. We have already noted methods of
control and regimentation that function in order to “fix the premises of [university]
discourse”. Furthermore, the propaganda model explains another aspect of the
contradiction between critical freedom and social integration: “these filters occur so
naturally that media news people, frequently operating with complete integrity and
goodwill, are able to convince themselves that they choose and interpret the news
‘objectively’ and on the basis of professional news values.”89 With similar filters
operating in the world of the university, many professors may feel they are acting with a
similar integrity without even noticing the capitalist control of knowledge—the knowledge
economy—ox, perhaps like Dewey, Laidler, and Bercuson and his crew, many professors
believe that this knowledge economy is something to which their courses must conform.
What is important to note, then, is that in both mass media and the educational
system there is a “basic social structural fact... [which] is that large capitalist

86 ibid.
87 McMurtry, p. 139.
88 ibid., p. 138.
89 Herman and Chomsky, p. 2.
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corporations... control production and distribution of social goods so as to maximize
private capital or social command owned by these capitalist corporations”.90 Thus there
is an underlying principle which constitutes “the regulative structure o f context within
which public discourse and communication are situated.”91 This regulative structure is
coincides with Herman and Chomsky’s propaganda model —a succession of educational
filters or gates (ibid., p. 136)~and the context is the delirium of Capitalism. Not only
does such a propaganda model attempt to render certain facts “unspeakable” but, as
McMurtry notes, it produces “a second-order rale against recognizing there is a rale
against their social assertion.”92 In other words, there is a structural attempt to rale out
recognition that there is a regulative structure that precludes criticism from the arena of
discourse.

Conclusion
At this point in the paper I have hopefully made a number of ideas clear. This
thesis began by asserting the contradiction between critical freedom and social
integration: there is a freedom to study and learn and publish, but the university exists in
order to integrate students into the socius. Each chapter has examined aspects of this
contradiction, culminating in this chapter where the contradiction was investigated in
light of the university’s educational model. This contradiction is not merely a
fundamental contradiction in the liberal university, but a shadow of the contradictory
aspects of capitalism—just as it was supposed that the university is the shadow of the
State and society’s dominant ideology.

90 McMurtry, p. 134.
91 ibid., p. 135.
92 ibid., p. 139.
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Moreover, hopefully a number o f potential contradictions in this very paper have
been dealt with. The fact that the alienated student is oppressed by her professor, for
instance, would seem to contradict the other assertions in which the professor has been
portrayed as the oppressed as well, and not the oppressor. According to Freire’s “teacherstudent contradiction”, however, such a conceptual problem is done away with: both
teacher and student are controlled but the capitalist educational framework sets up a
hierarchy in which the student is below the teacher—one is labourer and the other
manager, but both are ultimately alienated workers. The second conceptual problem this
paper presented was the second chapter’s focus on regimentation and control; the
university was likened to a giant machine in which all are captured, disciplined, and
enslaved. The contradictory educational nature of the university discussed in this chapter,
however, should make the truth of this regimentation and control clear; there is a
regimental nature to the university that attempts to bind the freedom inside its gates. It is
this critical freedom and its potential to be extended outside of the university that will be
discussed in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER FOUR
towards a new pedagogy
“Future outlines for liberation... must find a key to
unlocking the closed, reactionary consciousness and
awakening the desire for emancipation and
liberation.”
Red Army Faction, Statement o f the RAF (the 1998
disbanding o f the Red A rm y Faction)

Introduction
It should be obvious at this point that the philosophical framework of the
university is flawed due to the contradictions discussed in the previous chapter.
University reforms, o f the kind supported by Laidler or Bercuson, are usually aimed at
fixing problems within a flawed institution rather than fixing the institution in and of
itself. Such reforms, then, will merely be a tinkering with the apparatus of capture, a
maintenance of the educational machine. This strategy is akin to fixing the piping of a
building which suffers from foundational problems. Furthermore, such reforms are
tolerated and even encouraged by the socius as a whole, as evidenced by the Laidler
study, Bercuson and his allies, and other latter-day Deweys. Reforming and permitting
the critical freedom within the university while still encouraging social integration is
regressive, and in no way aids a true reformation.
By permitting “increases and improvements of standards at the center”, the
university “displaces the harshest forms of exploitation from the center to the periphery,
but also multiplies enclaves of overpopulation in the center itself, and easily tolerates the
so-called [freedom].”1 Even though subject to alienation and regimentation, the
population of privileged students are able to enjoy a break from the real world of work
while they remain at the centre of a bounded world of higher education. Moreover, such
a freedom is tolerated because it does not threaten the overall goal of economic

1 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 373.
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integration and machinic enslavement with which the socius is concerned. “It is not
kibbutz-style socialism that troubles the Zionist state,” write Deleuze and Guattari, “just
as it [was] not Russian socialism that trouble[d] world capitalism.”2 Just as Zionist
imperialism is not threatened by the freedom of the kibbutz, and Russian socialism,
lacking true freedom, was able to be integrated into the capitalist world order, similarly
the freedom of liberal pedagogical reforms do not threaten the capitalist university
institution and are easily integrated into the overall framework. Thus, it is the framework
of the university itself that must be changed—a framework which should not exist as a
mere shadow of the socius as it has in the past.
With this concluding chapter I hope to describe the shape o f a radical, liberatory
pedagogy which could possibly resolve the contradiction between critical freedom and
social integration. The shape of such a pedagogy, however, is just that: a shape. Given
the social reality within which the modem university is situated, it is not completely
possible for a radically free pedagogy to be instituted, and I will discuss this problem
towards the end of this section.
The path towards examining a different system of pedagogy has lead through a
number of interrelated terrains: it began with an examination of the capitalist nature of the
university; it traveled through the territory where this nature caused discipline and
regimentation, and it progressed through the area where the contradictions of the previous
regions were revealed. Now the path this thesis has taken will near its goal, beginning
with a discussion of Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of liberating desire. I will follow this
up with Guattari’s idea of molecular revolutions, and with Freire’s theory of education in
Pedagogy of the Oppressed. Finally, I hope to tie all of these concepts together and in a
description of the shape of a radical pedagogy.

2 ibid., p. 373-374.
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Liberating unconscious desire
In the art house horror film Profundo Rosso (“Deep Red”), by acclaimed Italian
filmmaker Dario Argento, the mystery of a brutal hatchet murder becomes an obsession
for the jazz musician protagonist. The protagonist, however, begins his own private
investigation o f this murder based on a framework of presuppositions and biases, not only
about the murder but about life itself. At one point in the film the protagonist discovers
an infantile painting hidden behind a wall covered in plaster in an old house, a painting
which he believes is a vital clue. As he scratches away the plaster to reveal the picture
beneath he discovers a depiction of another murder which confirms his previous biases
about his own investigation. Pleased with this discovery the obsessive jazz musician
leaves the house. As this character walks out of frame, however, another chunk of plaster
falls from the wall and reveals another part of the portrait which throws the protagonist’s
entire framework into question. It is too late, though, the main character has already left,
having stopped his examination of this vital clue at a point that justified his earlier
assumptions. Furthermore, the protagonist’s inability to question the dominant
interpretation of the murder eventually causes him to make illogical deductions resulting
in the death of one o f his friends and the hospitalization of another.
Dewey and his antecedents begin their critique of the educational institution in a
manner similar to the protagonist o f Profundo Rosso. They assume the capitalist
framework and accept the implications it entails. As I have already noted, the liberal
educational project presupposes a model of economic integration. The university is
viewed as an institution that presupposes, reproduces, and reinforces the economic reality
of society. Therefore, in order to solve problems within the university, reforms are
pursued that accept the economic function of this institution as a given. Far from solving
the problems of education, however, this framework aids an educational murder. Far
from being a simple philosophical blunder, this problematic approach is symptomatic of
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capitalist thinking—educational philosophy is merely shadowed by the dominant ideology
of the socius which holds that all institutions must be part of its delirium.
Part of the logic of capitalism is “to present its work process as natural and
unchangeable, [even though] for technical reasons it is changing every day”.3 The
capitalist delirium has been accepted as an invariant and unchangeable reality; one has to
accept the worldwide market and modem capitalist modes of production in order to
succeed. But not only did the market depend on quite specific social relations, it is
always changing since, according to Deleuze and Guattari, it possess no definite
“coding”--the capitalism of early industrialism is different, in many respects, from the
capitalism today. Nevertheless, “[a]n equation is established, in which capitalist
advancement and exploitation are seen as essential features of social machinery-that is
the meaning o f society, and of course it has become true.. .”4 In other words, although
the capitalist reality is constantly changing (from industrialism to post-industrialism), the
population at large accepts its delirium as essential to societal functioning, the reason
being that “Communism” (perceived as the only alternative to capitalism) has failed and
so capitalism is the only valid system. By investing our desire in this belief, we allow this
reality (which is really a delirium) to govern our lives, even though our very investment
and beliefs prove the capitalist reality is reified and is nothing more than delirium, a true
consciousness of false reality.
According to Deleuze and Guattari, this logic of capitalism is accepted because, as
with previous social systems, our unconscious desire (what we really want and need) has
been co-opted and infused with the ideology of capitalism:
the unconscious productions and formations [of desire]
were not merely repelled by an agency o f psychic repression
that would enter into compromises with them, but actually
3 Guattari and Negri, p. 15.
4 ibid., p. 23.
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covered over by anti-formations that disfigure the
unconscious in itself, and impose on it causations,
comprehensions, and expressions that no longer have
anything to do with its real functioning.5
Thus our desire to work with a community is distorted and transformed into a desire to
work an alienating forty hours at an office with other overworked bureaucrats. Our desire
to survive is perverted until we end up with a desire to climb the social ladder of wageslavery. Our desire to learn becomes a desire to learn a discipline that will give us a wellpaying job. We are conditioned, from birth, to associate with people and objects in a
capitalist manner: “[cjhildren begin learning about capitalism in the cradle, before they
have access to speech. They learn to perceive capitalist objects and relations on
television, through the family, in the nursery.”6
The evidence of this capitalist co-optation of desire is found in the liberal model
of education. Dewey, Laidler, and Bercuson all genuinely desire a reformation of the
university institution, but their desire for this reformation has already been co-opted by
the capitalist socius—“an idea that [capitalist] ‘reason’ imposes on the unconscious and
introduces into the passional sphere, and is not by any means the formation o f this
sphere'’.7 Therefore, liberal reformers’ desire to mend the university apparatus becomes
wed to a desire to perpetuate the delirium o f capitalism. Thus, they contradict the desire
for freedom that they purport to espouse. The poles of production and antiproduction
become fused together:
Oh, to be sure, it is not for himself or his children that the
capitalist works, but for the immortality of the system. A
violence without purpose, a joy, a pure joy in feeling
oneself a wheel in the machine... Placing oneself in a

5 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 338-339.
6 Guattari, p. 10.
7 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 323, emphasis added.
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position where one is thus traversed, broken, fucked by the
socius, looking for the right place where, according to the
aims and the interests assigned to us... each one in his own
place, the banker, the cop, the soldier, the technocrat, the
bureaucrat.8
In other words: the proletarianization o f the world. By distorting desire, capitalism
becomes the dominant framework.
Returning to the model of Argento’s film, the protagonist’s obsessive desire to
solve the brutal hatchet murder was, from the very beginning, subordinated to his
preconceived notions about society in general. He not only attaches himself to the
official police framework concerning the case, but he allows his desire for closure to be
invested with numerous social biases. For example, he believes that women are
essentially weaker and passive, and he believes that homosexuals are social deviants. The
incomplete portrait behind the plaster displays the murderer as a homosexual man, while
the complete picture reveals the truth: the actual killer is a heterosexual woman.
Analogously, with their own desire attached to the logic of capitalism, liberal educational
reformers are defined by an inability to grasp the fundamental problem of education—the
contradiction between critical freedom and social integration—and end up supporting this
“killer” by accepting the philosophy of the socius.
Thus “Capitalism remains a formidable desiring machine”, and its co-opted flows
of desire flood “the schools, the factories, the neighbourhoods, the prisons, etc.”9 With
unconscious desire functioning in such a manner, any real change “is not a question of
adapting it, socializing it, disciplining [the university institution],” as liberal reformers
would have one believe, “but of plugging it in such a way that its process not be
interrupted in the social body, and that its expression is collective.”10 Although the logic
8 ibid., p. 346-347.
9Deleuze

a n d G u a tta ri,

"Capitalism: AVery Special Delirium” , p. 219.

10 ibid.
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of capitalism may, as Deleuze and Guattari suggest, function at an unconscious level, they
also suggest we can change our unconscious~we can liberate our desire. For Deleuze and
Guattari such a liberation is possible because “the unconscious” is not a secret world
inhabited by Freudian structures which are intrinsic to our nature as human beings; it is
simply what the word itself implies: what we are not conscious o f —it is not a
“subconscious”. Therefore, we can make ourselves conscious of our desire and how it
has been appropriated by the socius by asking the question “what do I really desire?”, and
affect “a revolutionary break [with co-opted desire] at the unconscious level”.11
For underneath our co-opted desire we truly possess a desire for freedom and
community; humans are, after all, social animals and most great political theorists have
recognized this fact. Indeed, States themselves are founded on the desire to live in
community, and the desire for political freedom has been articulated in countless
instances-the French Revolution, the fight for the abolition of slavery, Mandela’s
struggle against apartheid, etc. While this desire may be appropriated by the capitalist
socius—where countless McCarthies and Bushes can claim that any hatred of capitalism
and/or imperialism is a hatred of freedom-this desire can also be liberated as soon as its
co-option is recognized.
Although I do not want to get sidetracked by what authentic liberation means, part
of its definition should be obvious. The above examples, for instance, were defined in
part by the concept of self-determination (the slaves should be freed to determine
themselves as humans, not to be sold as animals). Even the McCarthies and Bushes
would accede to this definition, but their practices reduce such a definition to mere
propaganda (peoples’ ability to determine themselves, for example, can only be achieved
under the framework of the free market), and contradict this definition by their practices

11 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 375.
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(financing death-squads, setting up puppet-dictatorships, etc.). Thus an authentic straggle
for freedom is defined by the implicit desire to liberate a person or group from institutions
or governments which negatively affect its development as human, whereas inauthentic
straggles for freedom are defined by an underlying desire to merely topple one form of
slavery for another (ie. in the film Burn!, the British government incites a slave revolution
in order to overthrow the Dutch government, take over, and turn the former slaves into
wage-slaves).
But let us return to the concept of co-opted desire as it is depicted in Profundo
Rosso. Argento’s protagonist’s authentic desire is partially defined by an obsession with
what he believes to be a crucial piece of evidence, a missing painting from the scene of
the crime. At the conclusion o f the film, however, he returns to the crime scene and
learns that there never was a missing picture. Rather, he had actually seen a mirror which
had reflected the face of the killer as it stood behind him and in front of another painting.
Staring at his own reflection in the mirror, the truth of the killer’s identity is finally
revealed. As soon as the protagonist confronts his own assumptions, the lies are exposed
and the film ends. Analogously, this thesis has attempted to confront the capitalist
assumptions of liberal educators; in the next two sections I hope to end this project by
tracing a path which will allow for Deleuze and Guattari’s “revolutionary break at the
unconscious level”.

Molecular revolutions
The project, then, is to discover the shape of a truly revolutionary desire for
education. The problem, however, is that “desire is being delegated to representatives
and bureaucrats of all kinds... [and] is turned into organizational microfascism.”12 In
12 Guattari, p. 10.
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other words, since our authentic desire has been wed to the forces of capitalism it has
begun to regiment our lives in accordance with the capitalist socius. Our desire for a
liberatory pedagogy, in other words, has become mixed up with the regimental nature of
the liberal university. As aforementioned, capitalism has co-opted desire through “the
semiotic subjugation of all individuals”13—a regime of signs, a faciality machine. From
the cradle to the grave individuals learn to “perceive capitalist objects and relations on
television, through the family, in the nursery”14, or through numerous institutions
including the university.
Therefore, in terms of the university apparatus, the student essentially learns “a
behavioural model adapted to certain social castes.”15 The regimentation and discipline
discussed in previous chapters all contribute to to the semiotic subjugation of the student:
What you require of your students before all else when you
make them take an exam is a certain style of semiotic
moulding, a certain initiation to the given castes. This
initiation is all the more brutal in the context of manual
formation, with the training of workers. Exams, the
movement from position to position in factory work,
always depend on whether one is Black, Puerto Rican, or
raised in a well-to-do neighbourhood, whether one has the
right accent, is a man or woman.16
Although the modem liberal university may pride itself on its tolerance and equity, it is
still a place where there “are signs of recognition, signs of power that operate during
instmctional formation, and they are veritable rites of initiation.”17 Bercuson, for

13 ibid.
14 ibid.
15 ibid.,

p. 11.

16 ibid.
17 ibid.
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example, while glorifying the freedom of the university, still defended the privileged
position of the white male.18
Moreover, the signs and structures of power were evident in the very mode that
Felix Guattari delivered the lecture, at a university convention, upon which this section is
based. Guattari writes:
O ne... truly awful arrangement from the vantage point of
the arrangements of desire—is that of this room itself, with
some individual raised above everyone else, with a prepared
discussion which would make it impossible for anyone
really to start a discussion.19
Guattari even suggested that the format of the session should be changed, but those
present refused, some even asked for the return of their money.20 The issue, then, was
not the information being transmitted, but the authoritarian manner in which this
transmission was arranged. The lecturer speaks and those gathered desire to be spoken at,
feeling that this is what education is all about: the teacher-student contradiction.
According to Guattari, it is important to work towards new arrangements of desire
which will effectively break from a system that replicates capitalist arrangements. These
new arrangements o f enunciation^, Guattari claims, are “developing today, but at the
molecular or microscopic level.”22 Hence the term, molecular revolution. When Guattari
speaks of “molecular revolutions” he is referring to the idea o f “the molar” and “the
molecular” which is discussed at length in A Thousand Plateaus, co-authored with
Deleuze. Every society is composed by an interrelation between the molar and the
18 Bercuson, p. 48, see previous chapter.
19 G

u a tta ri,

p. 13.

20 ibid.
21 ibid.
22 ibid., p. 8.
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molecular. The former term designates a “realm of representations... [that] define largescale aggregates”23 (ie. a class designation, a type of State, etc.), and the latter term refers
to a “realm of beliefs and desires in which the distinction between the social and the
individual loses all meaning”24—the realm of authentic desire. The molar level, of course,
is composed by the molecular flows of desire: the socius as a “desiring-machine,” a social
machine which appropriates collective desire and links such desire to the propagation of
capital. Although “politics and its judgments are always molar”—America, for example,
attacked Grenada because it was going to form a collectivist economy and block
American investment—“it is the molecular and its assessment that makes it or breaks it.”25
In the earlier case o f the Vietnam war, for instance, the authentic “molecular” desire for
freedom was able to affect a molar movement within and without the socius (individuals
banded together to protest and resist, and Viet-Cong revolutionaries fought a successful
guerrilla battle); America had to pull out of the war.
Molecular revolutions, then, are small revolutionary struggles that develop in
different capitalist institutions and are aimed at reconstituting revolutionary desire: “[w]e
see students revelling, playing at the barricades. We see teenagers changing life in the
highschools.”26 In 1995 and 1996, for example “the email coordination of multicampus
protests [brought change] against reductions in student aid and rising tuition fees in
Canada and the United States.”27 The problem, though, is that the socius is quite apt at
appropriating this desire and recasting every struggle it confronts. In the face of student
discontent, for example, liberal reformers step in to convince the alienated rebels that
23 Deleuze and Guattari, 1000 Plateaus, p. 219.
24 Guattari, p. 8.
25 ibid., p. 222.
26 ibid.
27 Dyer-Witheford, p. 236.
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what is needed is a mere tinkering with the university machine rather than a systematic
overhaul. Graduate students on strikes are bought off with more money, and they are
convinced that this is what will settle their demands.
Furthermore, as has been analyzed at numerous points in this thesis, the teachers
and the students are socially separated by the teacher-student contradiction. The point of
molecular revolutions, therefore, is to recognize a “revolutionary consciousness...
situated within a ‘revolutionary body’, that is to say, within a body [that is, any social
arrangement of persons] that produces its own liberation.”28 This radical change of desire
will be further elaborated and explained when we turn to a discussion ofFreire’s
philosophy. What matters for Guattari, however, is that the “desire for a fundamental
liberation, if it is to be a truly revolutionary action, requires that we move beyond the
limits of our ‘person’... that we transcend our sedentary selves, our ‘normal social
identities’” 29 In other words, in order to affect a true liberation of education, students
and teachers must overcome the co-option of their own unconscious desires and revolt
against the social roles assigned to them by the apparatus of capture.
Once again I would like to stress that this molecular revolution need not be a
renunciation of education altogether. After all, “one can hardly imagine refusing to teach
[students] how to write or to recognize linguistic... signs. What matters is whether one
uses this semiotic apprenticeship to bring together power and the semiotic subjugation of
the individual, or if one does something else.”30 In order for a real, liberatory education
to take place, however, the contradiction discussed in this thesis must be abolished.
Accomplishing this requires a movement—to change the
character of [the university] itself.
And redefining
[education] as creative activity can only happen as
28Guattari, p. 30,
29 ibid., p. 32.
30 ibid., p. 22, emphasis added.
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individuals emerge from stifled, emotionally blocked
rhythms o f constraint.31
This redefinition—the emergence of the radical shape of pedagogy—will be discussed in
the following section.

A radical pedagogy
It should be obvious, then, that a new and radical form of education is needed in
order to dissolve the current contradiction within which the liberal university is trapped.
There needs to be a fundamental change in the character of pedagogy—a different kind of
education. In 1970, the Brazilian philosopher Paulo Freire developed this different kind
of pedagogical system in which those educated would “come to a new awareness of
selfhood and begin to look critically at the social situation in which they find
themselves”32, and desire to change society.
Originally designed for an uneducated peasant population, Freire’s philosophy of
education “enabled three hundred workers in the town of Angicas, Northern Rio Grande,
Brazil, to become literate in forty-five days. In addition to being able read and write, they
were also politically literate.”33 And in “Chile, where he worked on Agrarian Reform
project, [Freire] cut the illiteracy rate to five per cent in six years.”34 Although Freire’s
philosophy is primarily orientated towards illiterate adults, it would be a mistake to
assume that his pedagogical approach cannot be applied to post-secondary education:
his methodology as well as his educational philosophy are
as important for us as for the dispossessed in Latin
America. Their struggle to become free Subjects and to
31 G u a t t a r i

32 S h a u l l ,

and Negri, p. 13-14.

Richard, from the Forward to Pedagogy o f the Oppressed, p. 11.

33 Boyd, p. 203.
34 ibid., p. 204.
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participate in the transformation of their society is similar,
in many ways, to the struggle... of middle-class young
people in this country... And the sharpness and intensity of
that struggle in the developing world may well provide us
with new insight, new models, and a new hope as we face
our own situation.35
Basing myself on this interpretation, I will use Freire’s philosophy in order to frame a
new model for education, a model which will promote the revolutionary desire for
liberation. The investigation o f such a model will begin by discussing it in relation to the
banking concept and the teacher-student contradiction, and then conclude with an analysis
of Freire’s idea of dialogics and how this pedagogical method relates to a liberation of
desire.
In the last chapter I outlined Freire’s analysis of the banking concept of education.
As we saw, this model produces a “teacher-student contradiction.” It is this concept
which must be abandoned in order to resolve its contradiction. “Liberating education,”
writes Freire, “consists in acts of cognition, not transferrals of information.”36 The
banking concept must be rejected in order to create a new concept of the student-a
concept which does not view women and men as vessels of knowledge that need to be
filled, but as “conscious beings, and consciousness as consciousness intent upon the
world.”37 In other words, education should strive to produce a consciousness that is
rooted in reality and not delirium.
Human beings, according to Freire, are historical and possess the ability to engage
with reality. They create and change it. “To exist, humanly,” he writes, “is to name the
world, to change it. Once named, the world in its turn reappears to the namers as a

35 Shaull, p. 10.
36 Freire, p. 60.
37 ibid.

105
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

problem and requires of them a new naming. ”38 As humans we are part o f a history of
knowledge in which we have engaged with our world and attempted to comprehend and
name it--to map its reality, so to speak. Aristotle, to cite one example, wrote the
Categories in which he attempted to name foundational concepts so others could
understand the world. The Categories, however, re-presented the world as a new problem
and others would eventually participate in a new naming. Histories are constructed by a
method of naming and renaming, and this is why humans possess the ontological nature
of historical beings. In other words, if humans did not exist, the concept o f the world
would not exist; there would be no one around to say this is the w orld.39 Therefore,
“[h]uman beings are not built on silence, but in word, in work, in action-reflection.”40
The banking concept of education, however, denies humans their ontological
vocation by reducing the educational process to a structure of facts which proceed from
an authoritarian lectern. Students are certainly shown how all of these facts are
questionable—how all the names can be renamed—and sometimes they are even given the
tools to question and rename. But at the end of their term their education terminates with
an exam or final paper, and they become a disciplined individual in an economic reality
which cannot be renamed. The authority that names, at the same time defines the limits
of questionability. Humanity’s ontological function as historical beings requires an
education which allows for a critical engagement, and prom otes the ability to change
society as a whole.

Thus, in order to reach a radically free pedagogy, we “must abandon the
educational goal of deposit-making and replace it with the posing of the problems of

38 ibid., p. 69.
39 ibid., p. 63.
40 ibid.
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human beings in their relations with the world.”41 This problem posin g education is a
system of pedagogy which resolves the teacher-student contradiction. “It is a learning
situation in which the cognizable object [of education] intermediates the cognitive actors-teachers on the one hand and students on the other”42-a n d the process of education
becomes dialogical:
Through dialogue, the teacher-of-the-students and the
students-of-the-teacher cease to exist and a new term
emerges: teacher-student and students-teachers.
The
teacher is no longer merely the-one-who-teaches, but one
who is himself taught in dialogue with the students, who in
turn while being taught also teach. They become jointly
responsible for a process in which all grow 43
Freire is not describing a chaotic classroom free-for-all, but an organized process of
dialogue. At an elementary school level this process might be absurd (one envisions
children running amok, eating paste), but at a university level this process could definitely
take place. An organized dialogical process of education does not eliminate authority
altogether, it just eliminates authoritarian structures of pedagogy; “authority must be on
the side of Freedom, not against it.”44 In other words, professors will lead the dialogue

but they do not own the process: “the problem-posing educator constantly re-forms his
reflections in the reflection of the students.”45 One can imagine how this process of
dialogue could take place at a basic classroom level. When I was in high school, for
instance, there was one English teacher who structured his classes in this dialogical
manner: he would dispense with his lectem and the regimental seating arrangement, sit
41 ibid., p. 60.
42 ibid.
43 ibid., p. 61.
44 ibid.
45 ibid., p. 61-62.

107
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

amongst his students, and strike up an informal dialogue about our readings. Not only
would this teacher ask the students questions, but the students were encouraged to
question and argue with the teacher. Moreover, this teacher never used his educational
authority to dismiss certain questions; he often admitted he was in the wrong and showed
a genuine care and interest in everyone of his students’ opinions. Students in this
teachers’ class displayed a great interest to learn—they all wanted to bring something to
the dialogical process—and flourished under his encouragement.
Freire also holds that through a process of dialogue, education will become the
practice of cognitive freedom. Such a practice, since it is mediated by the social reality it
is situated within, “denies that man is abstract, isolated, independent, and unattached to
the world; it also denies that the world exists as a reality apart from people.”46 As has
been discussed at various points in this thesis, the capitalist system creates a delirium by
presenting its reality as unchangeable and eternal, even though capitalism is created by,
and supported by, social relations-relations that have been reified. By freely dialoguing
with knowledge and education in a manner unremoved from the social reality, people
become aware of their own human vocation and their own ability to change society.
Through Freire’s dialogics, the new student learns that her education is not divorced from
the world. Moreover, by participating in the active process of her own education, the
student will possibly have a desire awakened in her to continue this process outside of the
university setting. Freire, after all, was kicked out of Chile because he awakened this
desire in the peasants with whom he worked. Although there is a slight chance that some
students-like the audience at Guattari’s lecture—might rebel because too much is asked
of them, Freire, as will be evidenced below, never had to deal with this problem. This
fact may be due, in part, to the foundational concepts about dialogue of which this
specific pedagogical philosophy is composed.
46 ibid., p. 62.
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Since Freire’s concept of dialogue “is the encounter between men, mediated by
the world, in order to name the world”47, there are numerous concepts about dialogue
which he lays out in order to qualify his philosophy. As aforementioned, this radical
concept of education cannot be a chaotic free-for-all; if one is to learn, there must be a
conceptual framework. This framework, however, cannot be one that permits the
regimental nature o f the current educational system. Although Freire's dialogical process
is specifically orientated towards illiterate, adult peasants there are a number of lessons
which can be deduced.
First of all, dialogue “cannot exist... in the absence of a profound love for the
world and for people.”48 Naming and engaging with the world, after all, is an act of
creation, and problem posing education is an act of mutual pedagogy performed out of
respect of a mutual humanity. If one enters into educational dialogue with the desire to
dominate the students through this dialogue, one replicates oppression and reinstates the
teacher-student contradiction. “If I do not love the world,” writes Freire, “if I do not love
life—if I do not love people—I cannot enter into dialogue.”49 Obviously, the love meant
here is not romantic and/or erotic love, but what the Greeks would have called agape—
fellowship, a love for humanity where one conceives of one’s own humanity as part of the
humanity of the others involved in dialogue.
Secondly, “dialogue cannot exist without humility.”50 Without humility one
dialoguing party will project ignorance into the other and hence be unable to perform
dialogue since the other party will be regarded as inferior. The absence of humility again
reinforces the teacher-student contradiction and disrupts the mutual process of education:
47 ibid., p. 69.
48 ibid., p. 70.
49 ibid., p. 71.
50 ibid.

109

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

“[sjomeone who cannot acknowledge himself to be as mortal as everyone else still has a
long way to go before he can reach the point of [a dialogical] encounter.”51 If the
facilitator of this educational interchange infuses the dialogue with humility, then no one
side will be a depositor in a banking process of education; “there are only people who are
attempting together, to learn more than they now know.”52
Thirdly, dialogue “requires an intense faith in humankind, faith in their power to
make and remake, to create and re-create, faith in their vocation to be more fully
human”.53 Without this faith in the students engaged in dialogue, the dialogical process
is reduced to manipulation—a manipulation that attempts to force others to think in a
certain manner and to perceive a certain truth that one believes the students would fail to
grasp by themselves. (One cannot accept, therefore, the media myth that students are all
beer-swilling frat boys; the existence of such students, as discussed earlier, is due to an
educational contradiction contained in the liberal model of the university: stupidity wed to
knowledge)
Finally,
true dialogue cannot exist unless the dialoguers engage in
critical thinking—thinking which discerns an indivisible
solidarity between the world and the people and admits of
no dichotomy between them—thinking which perceives
reality as process, as transformation, rather than as a static
entity—thinking which does not separate itself from action,
but constantly immerses itself in temporality without fear
of the risks involved.54

51 ibid.

52 ibid.
53 ibid.
54 ibid., p. 73.
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In other words, a critical freedom that is not bound within the world of academia.
Although the values espoused by Freire are, indeed, “liberal” values, this process of
pedagogy permits a critical freedom that is concerned with the world outside of the
university, a type o f freedom sorely lacking in the current liberal model of education.
Freire believes that individuals engaged in the dialogical process must overcome
their appropriated desire—a desire that has been perverted into a desire to bow to the
socius: “I have encountered, both in training courses... and in actual experimentation
with a truly liberating education, the ‘fear of freedom’”.55 As Deleuze and Guattari have
pointed out, individuals’ authentic desire for freedom is co-opted by the “desiringmachine” of the socius so that “they confuse freedom with the maintenance of the status
quo”.56 Part of Freire’s dialogical pedagogy, however, affects a revolution at the
molecular level; it enables individuals to see their selves and their setting through a
critical and liberating dialogue. Critics of Freire’s position have exhibited this fear of
liberation, however, by claiming that such a system might lead to “destructive fanaticism”
or a “sensation o f total collapse of [the students’] world.”57 A peasant who had engaged
in Freire’s pedagogical process, however, replied to these objections:
Perhaps I am the only one here of working-class origin. I
can’t say that I’ve understood everything you’ve said just
now, but I can say one thing—when I began this course I
was naive, and when I found out how naive I was, I started
to get critical. But this discovery hasn’t made me a fanatic,
and I don’t feel any collapse either.58

55 ibid., p. 17.
56 ibid., p. 18.
57 ibid., p. 17.
58 ibid.
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Thus, Freire’s philosophy describes a radically new approach to education which
not only resolves the contradiction between critical freedom and economic integration (it
holds that critical freedom must affect the social setting), but possesses the power to
affect a molecular revolution of desire. The peasant who was quoted, after all, critically
investigated his presuppositions and soon desired to change his world. Imagine the
revolutionary power universities in North America would possess if their students,
working in conjunction with the professors, began to adopt this critical mind set. In the
following section o f this chapter I will investigate the possible implementation of a
radical pedagogy.

Conclusion - the shape of radical pedagogy
There are, o f course, conceptual problems concerning the adoption o f a radical
pedagogy. Probably the largest problem would be that of institutionalization: how does
one create universities founded on a dialogical process of education, and/or how does one
change the existing universities? This problem, however, is another thesis altogether.
The task of bringing a radically free university into being is vast and would require
devoted individuals; it requires a molecular revolution in order to become a molar
movement. And, obviously, different types of dialogics would need to be adapted for
different educational settings. The method of dialogue in Philosophy, for example, would
be different than the method of dialogue in Chemistry.
Moreover, there is the fundamental problem about the change of this pedagogy
even existing. As I have stated, the university apparatus is a reflection o f the socius.
Indeed, it exists because it is funded by the socius; it is not hard to imagine that the
economic nourishment would stop if the university began to critically question the hand
that feeds it. On the other hand, a privatised university would just be another spectre of
capitalism: corporations—which are pure reflections of the socius—would control
education and access to education would be limited to the economically privileged. And
112
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universities are already entering into alliances with corporations; this has only served to
make them more machine like. Even Freire understood this problem: “only a
revolutionary society can carry out this education in systematic terms”.59
Nevertheless, Freire was able to implement his philosophy with the help of grass
roots organizations (a molecular revolution at the heart of Brazil and then Chile) and so
maybe a grass roots movement of this kind will slowly spread, from molecular to molar,
creating wide institutional change. Furthermore, the philosophy of a radical pedagogical
system provides a critique of the liberal framework; it shows that the university, as it has
been presented by liberal reformers, is not a monolithic capitalist structure. It reveals the
university’s potential.
This being said, I will attempt to outline this potential shape which a radically free
university might take. The core concept of Freire’s pedagogical requirements is
cooperation-, “[sjubjects meet in cooperation in order to transform the world.”60 In an
educational setting, the importance of cooperation does not preclude any role for teachers
but means that teachers “do not own [the students’ education] and have no right to steer
[the students] blindly”.61 Therefore, any given university classroom must encourage a
free cooperative spirit: students and teachers should work together through a praxisoriented education, thus beginning a molecular movement—a connection between faculty
and students in different classrooms. This education must be an education which is
concerned with the social reality outside of the university instead of simply studies
abstracted from society (ie. the study of chemistry should not be divorced from the study
of how chemistry research has been used for the construction of chemical weapons).

59 ibid., p. 67.
60 ibid., p. 148.
61 ibid., p. 149.
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Indeed, Freire’s philosophy has described how the pedagogical system in a classroom can
be radicalized
The university classroom, however, is not the only issue at stake. The university
is an institution and, as an institution, its nature as a capitalist apparatus of capture has
been shown to go farther than the classroom—the reified administrative structure and its
existence as a capitalist space. Since the university has been an institution where “the
internal operations o f academia [have] become steadily more corporatized, with
management practices mirroring those of the private sector”62, then the entire institution
must be transformed—the administration must be reduced to a bare minimum (just
secretarial management, perhaps), tuition should be free, and the institution should be
democratic-students, teachers, and administration having equal input and voting pow erwhen it comes to making institutional choices. Such a transformation may not be
impossible; since this essay has admitted that there is a core of critical freedom evident in
the university, there should be a way this freedom can flee the capitalist apparatus of
capture—a line o f flight. According to Deleuze and Guattari:
a society is defined by its line of flight... There is always
something [that is, consciousness] that flows or flees, that
escapes the binary organizations, the resonance apparatus,
and the overcoding machine: things that are attributed to a
‘change in values, the youth, women, the mad, etc.63
For Deleuze and Guattari, no matter how harsh the nature of any given political or
institutional assemblage, there is always a route of escape that our revolutionary desire
takes. In the case of the university, this line of flight may be the study of social theory
that enable critical texts to be written and produced. The point for Deleuze and Guattari,
however, is to pursue this escape route in any way possible.
62 Dyer-Witheford, p. 110.
63 Deleuze and Guattari, 1000 Plateaus, p. 216.
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Although the university is, in Debord’s terms, a capitalist space —constructed to
reflect the realities o f the socius-its very assemblage can be used to subvert its nature.
As Dyer-Witheford writes in Cyber-Marx:
It is widely known that in the aftermath of the 1848
proletarian uprisings in Paris, Napoleon III ordered Baron
Haussmann to redesign the city, and that a centerpiece of
this urban reconstruction was the widening of streets to
allow the passage of artillery for the suppression of any
future insurrections. What is less well known is that
workers employed on this highway development project,
impoverished masons and builders housed in squalid
Parisian slums, were leading participants in the next
revolutionary outbreak—the 1871 Paris Commune that
seized the city in its entirety, rocking the stability of
capitalist Europe and giving Marx a blazing prefigurative
glimpse o f communist society.64
Thus, even though the reconstruction o f Parisian space was designed to reinforce State
power, it was ultimately used to subvert state power; it allowed potential insurrectionists
to link up and stage a revolution. According to Dyer-Witheford, the current realities of
capitalism engender similar lines of flight, and while “capital uses the university to
harness general intellect, insisting its work force engage in lifelong learning as the price
of employability, it runs the risk that people will teach and learn something other than
what it intends.”65
In the case of the university this line of flight is taking place, perhaps, at the level
of those professors who teach radical theory and social criticism and refuse to allow such
teachings to become reduced to abstractions. Although the university seems to be
becoming a harsher capitalist workplace—especially with the advent of online education—
these capitalist conditions will “create the grounds for a new relation between dissenting

64 Dyer-Witheford, p. 128-129.
65 ibid., p. 236.
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academics and oppositional social movements.”66 The fact that the university, as an
apparatus of capture, is tightening its control on its professors may mean that more
professors will become willing to take place in the revolutionary transformation of the
university:
Rather than descending from the heights of the university to
involve themselves in causes largely external to their daily
experience, possibilities emerge for academics to make
more ‘transverse’ connections. Academics perhaps lose
some pretensions as the bearer of great truths and grand
analysis, but they become the carriers of particular skills,
knowledge, and accesses useful to movements in which
they participate on the basis of increasing commonalities
with other [societal] members.67
Although the current assemblage of the capitalist university inspires this revolutionary
line of flight, it is up to professors to involve themselves in this struggle for pedagogical
transformation. In other words, even though such a revolutionary attitude may be
engendered by the increasing capitalisation of the university, it is up to the professors—
and the students as well—to embrace this attitude.
Such an attitude should also be encouraged in the university classroom. If
classroom dynamics take place in the manner outlined by Freire, then the revolutionary
counterflow will be strengthened. Students will be taught to participate in their vocation
of naming society and controlling their means of education. The cooperation between
faculty and students will galvanize the revolutionary opposition to the capitalist
university. In 1994, for example, students of Latino and Chicano background at the
universities o f Michigan, Colorado, and Nebraska, staged successful occupations and
hunger strikes, demanding antiracist initiatives in the university, but also grape boycotts

66 ibid., p. 234-235.
67 ibid., p. 235.

116

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

in support of farm workers across the United States. Their protests were not only
encouraged by their professors, but were “extensively connected and coordinated by
computer-communications facilitated by sympathetic librarians, faculty, and union
organizers.”68 Not only does this situation demonstrate how students and faculty can
work together, but it also demonstrates how the university can affect social change; the
boycotts were successful.
Therefore, if radicalization continues at the classroom and faculty level,
academics and students could be pulled into “contact with other public service workers
protesting cutbacks, wider labor and trade unionist organizations”69, as the students and
faculty of the above example eventually found themselves united with trade unions. Such
contacts will sow the seeds for the university to become a sight of free pedagogy. A
pedagogy which will, if fully liberated, continuously link up with unions and labour rights
groups-coordinating education with action. As Freire writes, “[kjnowledge of the
alienated culture leads to transforming action resulting in a culture which is being freed
from alienation.”70 The education one learns in the university should be taught in such a
way that it can be used in the interests of social freedom. The ideal university will have
perfected this method of teaching, cooperating with social movements outside of the
university and producing free students who desire to better their society and affect valid
social change. Furthemore, if the pedagogical methods of Freire begin, now, at a
molecular level in numerous classrooms, the university will grow more and more radical,
increasing the chances o f the existence o f the ideal university in reality.

68 ibid., p. 236.
69 ibid., p. 235.
70 Freire, p. 162.
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EPILOGUE
“philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways;
the point, however, is to change it."
-Karl Marx, “Theses on Feuerbach ”-

There are probably numerous questions this thesis has evoked in the reader which
may be cause for concern. I do not pretend to know what all of these questions are but, as
I conclude this project, I will attempt to address the most salient. There are two basic
categories of inquiry that I believe these questions will fall under: the first concerns the
basic presuppositions I have made, and the second concerns the validity of the method of
pedagogy suggested in the last chapter.
Concerning this thesis’ presuppositions one may argue, you claim that the liberal
philosophers o f education do not question their capitalist fram ework, but you fa il to
question the validity o f the anti-capitalist theories you utilize. From the very outset of

this project I have engaged with various theoretical frameworks of Marxist and postMarxist origin. It is true that I do not frilly question these modes of discourse, but the
ultimate test o f any theory is whether it reveals some critical truth. It should be clear to
anyone who even attempts to look at this world critically that there is something wrong
with an educational system that claims to possess a method of free discourse and yet may
also shove students into a system that, to the a certain degree, “continues to subjugate all
desires... and affects to the dictatorship of its totalitarian organization, founded on
exploitation, property, male power, profit, productivity.”1
Few would claim that there is nothing wrong with an institution which contradicts
itself at every turn: you ’re free, but only free to get a jo b . Moreover, the illogical nature
of the socius at large should be evident every time one turns on the television or reads the
newspaper. The totalitarian nature of integrated world capitalism is conveyed in the
speeches by United States Presidents and United Nations officials. We are living in an
1 Guattari, p. 29.
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era where corporations can sue developing countries in the interest of the world market.
Therefore, theories which question this world-wide system reveal its inherent
contradictions and are thus true to that extent.
Furthermore, Dewey’s antecedents, while admitting that there is indeed something
wrong with the university, have failed to reform this institution; it is still the same old
system—maybe a little different from the days of yore, but an ivory-tower nonetheless.
Higher education may have been made more accessible, but it is still an insulated world
of privilege. Increasing tuition rates are slowly eroding accessibility; liberal reforms are
running their due course: orientating an institution towards the economy will only
transform it into a cash cow. These arguments have been empirically confirmed by David
Noble’s investigation of online universities, which has aptly described the fact that
decisions are being made out of a concern for profit and not education. Dewey, to his
credit, would probably cringe at the state of the universities today, but his philosophical
heirs-Laidler and his friends, for example—are excited about this direction.
The second set of questions concern the validity of Freire’s method of pedagogy
discussed in the last section: what makes this system any better than the liberal system o f
education? The answer to this kind of question is quite simple; any system should be

judged by its results. Liberal education is a successful theory of education, but only on its
own terms: it is not truly liberating, as I have argued, but skilling. On the other hand,
Freire’s philosophy was instrumental in educating a large group of illiterate peasants in a
very short period o f time and was, unlike the current form of liberal education, liberating.
The peasants Freire worked with had grown up under the status quo system of education
and had remained unable to read and write; they were able to learn, and liberate
themselves from the ignorance imposed by their society, under the framework laid out by
Freire. What is more, they desired to learn. To those who would decry these facts by
claiming that the status quo method of education is different in Latin America than in
North America, I want to reemphasize that Freire’s methodology has also been used in
119

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

areas o f America, with large populations of American students, with impressive results.2
If this method of pedagogy was successful with individuals who had never expressed the
desire to learn in the past, how successful do you think it will be with students who have
already been engaged in the learning process?
Doubtless there are other questions, and in a critically free process of inquiry,
such questions should exist and be open to dialogue. After all, questions will always be
permitted in the educational setting I have described.

In conclusion it should be obvious that this thesis is not merely about education
but about society as a whole. The university institution is a shadow, a reflection, of the
social reality it occupies. But this thesis has suggested that the university can be much
more than a simple shadow that mimics the social machine. More than the contradictory
world shaped by the forces of capitalism, I propose that the university can and should be a
force of social change.
One problem with this proposal is that this thesis is not exempt from the academic
framework that it has criticized. It may seem like outright hypocrisy that I am attacking
the very system o f pedagogy within which I am engaged; this paper is written as a
requirement for the liberal university—a disciplinary academic hoop that the graduate
student hops through in order to fulfill tradition. It has been written in line with the
academic method, and is somewhat inseparable from Freire’s teacher-student
contradiction. It has still been written, however, within a space which still allows one to
engage in a form o f critical discourse. It is my sincere opinion that university education
possesses the power to affect social change even though this power has long been eroded
by the shadow o f disciplinary tradition and economic integration.

2 Freire, p. 138, see previous chapter.
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In May 1968 in Paris, France the university students revolted and built barricades
in the streets. Their rebellion affected a revolt within the Paris factories; the workers
rebelled and joined the students in their barricades. The student revolutionaries of 1968
“revealed the fragility of the social contracts installed successively to contain the
revolutionary movements of the beginning of the century”.3 Ultimately this revolt was
short-circuited and both the university and society returned to the way they were before
the students rebelled. What counted, however, “amounted to a visionary phenomena, as
if a society suddenly perceived what was intolerable in itself and also saw the possibility
of change.”4 While May 1968 might have been a mere blip on the radar of revolution, it
demonstrates that university students have the power to affect social change. Imagine
what this power might be like if teachers join with students in a radical, uncontradictory
university that attempts to change society instead of simply existing as its shadow.

3 Guattari

and Negri, p. 20.

4 Deleuze

and Guattari, “May 68 Did Not Take Place”, p. 209.
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